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The first chapter of this dissertation examines welfare impacts of a
combination of subsidies to alternative fuels (AFs) and alternative fuel vehicles
(AFVs), and how they compare to gasoline taxes. The particular AF examined
here is ethanol that is produced from agricultural products in a small open
economy. The model in this paper characterizes a country or state where
gasoline is the major source of fuel for automobiles, but that also produces
and consumes ethanol as an AF. Gasoline combustion is polluting and its use
equals the total amount of emissions produced. Thus, a gasoline tax here is
the same as an emissions tax and is the most direct environmental instrument.
However, increasing gasoline taxes for pollution purposes is often politically
not feasible. Thus, this paper studies how closely subsidies to alternative fuels
(AFs) and alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) emulate abatement behavior from a
unit gasoline tax in a simple three sector general equilibrium model, and in the
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presence of pre-existing labor taxes. The model can also be used to track the
effects of each policy on outputs, exports, and fuel use. The analytical results
of the model are then calibrated to data from the largest ethanol producing
state in the U.S., namely Illinois. The paper finds that subsidies can achieve up
to 64 percent of the welfare gains from the gasoline tax, if the uncompensated
wage elasticity is low enough or the elasticities of substitution between the
transportation goods is high enough.
The second chapter estimates behavior of households who jointly make
discrete decisions about vehicle ownership and continuous decisions about
miles driven. The paper uses seven years of data from 1995-2001 for the 35
states and union territories of India. The estimated parameters will be used
to calculate elasticities of each different type of vehicle for percentage changes
in petrol price per unit distance travelled and in vehicle taxes. The paper also
computes income and price elasticities for petrol consumption. Two types of
vehicles predominant in India are cars and two-wheelers such as motorcycles,
mopeds, and scooters. The latter type of vehicle is more fuel efficient than
the former. However, patterns of vehicle ownership across the country reflect
a growing number of cars relative to motorcycles. This paper investigates the
impact alternative policies such as taxes on petrol or on cars have on efficient
methods of vehicle emission abatement in India. In particular, the chapter
estimates the effect of each such policy on vehicle choice and driving behavior,
and how they in turn affect emissions. The main results are summarized as
follows: First, continuous choice own-price elasticities are higher for 4w rel-
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ative to 2w, given age, and for older vehicles relative to newer ones, within
each category. Second, discrete choice own-price elasticities with respect to
capital cost are higher for 2w relative to 4w. Moreover, older vehicles of each
type are more sensitive to higher vehicle prices relative to their newer coun-
terparts. Third, income elasticities for discrete vehicle choices are all positive
and greater than unity. Thus, higher income encourages purchase of newer ve-
hicles of each type. Moreover, usage of vehicles rises with income, conditional
on the particular vehicle choice. Finally, the paper conducts simulations that
alter the price per kilometer by adding either an additional gas tax, a distance
tax or an emissions tax. Results show that a distance tax reduces vehicle
kilometers traveled the most, followed by an emissions tax and lastly by the
gas tax. However, local emissions are reduced the most by an emissions tax,
followed by a distance tax and then by a gasoline tax. Even though it would be
ideal to compare the results obtained in this paper to results generated using
a micro-level data set, the estimates presented here are indicative of whether
a distance tax or a gasoline tax is more effective for emissions abatement in
India.
The third chapter of this dissertation evaluates how information asym-
metry in private automobile markets affects programs to accelerate vehicle
retirement, also known as scrappage programs. We use a dynamic framework
where agents have heterogenous preference for car quality. Cars can either be
new, or used. While all new cars have the same quality, used cars can be of
high- or low-quality. The quality of a car is perfectly correlated with emissions.
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The goal of a scrappage program is to induce car owners to voluntarily scrap
low-quality used cars. One key result is that in the presence of adverse selec-
tion a subsidy that maintains an active resale market unambiguously makes
all types of consumers better off. However, if this option of implementing the
subsidy does not exist, then the only other way to induce effective scrappage in
our framework is to shut down the used car market. Welfare implications sug-
gest that it might be better not to do anything rather than have a scrappage
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Chapter 1
General Equilibrium Impacts of Subsidies to
Ethanol and Ethanol-fuelled Vehicles
Vehicle ownership and its use has been increasing in developed as well
as developing countries. While 60 percent of the world’s vehicle fleet is held
in developed countries, the ownership of automobiles has been growing the
fastest in developing countries.1 Automobiles contribute to a range of local
and regional pollutants such as carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC),
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and fine particu-
late matter. In U.S. cities, in 1999 automobiles were responsible for 51 percent
of carbon monoxide (CO), 29 percent of hydrocarbon emissions, 34 percent
of nitrogen oxides and 10 percent of fine particulate matter (PM2.5).2 Some
of these local pollutants react with sunlight in a series of complex chemical
processes in the atmosphere to produce ozone or urban smog. This in turn
increases risk of respiratory problems and reduces immunity to bacteria and vi-
ral infection. Automobiles also exacerbate stocks of carbon dioxide (CO2) and
other greenhouse gases (GHGs) that lead to climate change. Thus, pressures
for new and more extensive forms of environmental regulation in the auto-
1See Harrington and McConnell, 2003.
2Data obtained from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/overview/pollutants.
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mobile sector have grown over the years, both in developed and developing
countries.
Total emissions from vehicles can be reduced either by reducing vehi-
cle miles driven or by reducing the tailpipe emission rates per vehicle mile.
The standard economic argument for efficient reduction of tail-pipe emissions
in automobiles is to make the polluter pay for each unit of emissions either
through a tax or a permit price, as suggested by Pigou (1920). A price per unit
of emissions provides all the right incentives to reduce emissions by abating
through the cheapest means such as switching to clean fuels, employing abate-
ment technology, or by reducing use of the polluting fuel itself. Since given
current technology tailpipe emissions are not observable, alternative policies
such as gasoline taxes and subsidies to alternative fuels (AFs) and alternative
fuel vehicles (AFVs) are often imposed to achieve efficient abatement in vehicle
emissions.3
In this paper, I compare the general equilibrium effects of subsidies
to the alternative fuel sector to more traditional market based environmental
instruments such as a gasoline tax, where each of the policies are designed
to reduce emissions by 1 percent. I assume that gasoline combustion in the
transportation sector to be the only source of pollution. For simplicity I also
assume that the amount of emissions produced per unit of gasoline used is
3Fullerton and West (2002) show that the efficiency results of an emissions tax can
be mimicked by a complicated tax on gasoline and consumption. However, their policies
depend on vehicle characteristics that can be tampered with. Moreover, such policies would
be complicated to implement.
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fixed. Thus, a gasoline tax is the same as an emissions tax in the model con-
sidered here. However, a gas tax is not always a politically feasible instrument
since gasoline is a necessity and hence taxing it is regressive from a distri-
butional perspective. Moreover, vehicles that contribute to pollution are in
highly populated and congested urban areas. This implies that increasing the
gas tax for environmental purposes makes everybody pay for the increase in
pollution levels caused by a relatively small share of the population. Thus,
the case for a second best scenario is the political infeasibility of implementing
a gas tax. The particular type of alternative fuel I consider here is ethanol,
produced from a variety of agricultural products around the world such as
from corn in the U.S and from sugarcane in Brazil. The welfare effects of
these alternatives are examined in the presence of pre-existing labor taxes and
subsidies to ethanol and AFVs.
To compare the impact of the subsidies to that of a gasoline tax, I
use a simple three sector general equilibrium model representing a small open
economy with general functional forms. I then differentiate the equations
to linearize them, and solve for the effects of each policy. This paper does
not focus on optimal rates for each of the policy variables in the second-best
framework. However, they can be calculated by differentiating the welfare
function with respect to the policy variables and set each of the derivatives
equal to zero to solve for the optimal gas tax, subsidy to ethanol and to
ethanol-fuelled vehicle. The optimal values of these policies will fall as the
price differential between gasoline and ethanol becomes lower, but they will
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not be reduced to zero due to the pollution generated from use of gasoline.
Ethanol is considered to have substantial environmental benefits. For
instance, General Motors and the Argonne National Laboratory in 2001 con-
ducted a life cycle assessment of a variety of alternative fuels and compared
the results to that of gasoline. They use several measures to compare the rela-
tive effectiveness of all fuels such as fuel economy in miles per gallon, seconds
taken to reach an acceleration speed of 60 miles per hour and the resulting
green house gas (GHG) emissions from the use of each fuel. With ethanol
they find that a conventional vehicle that uses 85 percent ethanol has the
same fuel economy as a gasoline powered engine, but its GHG emissions are
only one-third as high. Moreover, renewable ethanol combined with a fuel cell
propulsion system produces more miles per gallon compared to a gasoline vehi-
cle, and its GHG emissions are close to zero. The primary purpose for offering
incentives to encourage greater use of alternative fuels such as ethanol, is to
reduce dependence on imports of oil. A secondary benefit from providing sub-
sidies to ethanol users is reduction in air pollution. Thus, a price of gasoline
close to that of ethanol might induce some substitution towards consumption
of cleaner fuel at the margin. However, the extent of this switch will most
likely not be sufficient to correct for the negative externality generated from
gasoline use. This need necessitates the use of subsidies to ethanol despite the
recent phenomenon of rising gasoline prices. This paper examines the effec-
tiveness of such incentives to ethanol as an environmental instrument when
compared to existing fuel taxes.
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Most papers on alternative-fuel vehicles estimate how their demand
depends on various vehicle attributes.4 These papers find that fuel cost is a
significant factor determining the choice of an alternative fuel vehicle, holding
other factors such as availability and other vehicle attributes constant. Proost
and Van Dender (2001) is the only paper to my knowledge that compares the
welfare effects of alternative fuel policies to other transport policies as possible
environmental instruments and find that the latter perform better than the
former. No paper to my knowledge compares the welfare effects of existing
subsidies in the ethanol sector to other environmental instruments. A relevant
idea in environmental economics claims that revenue-raising environmental
policies could be used to lower distorting taxes elsewhere in the economy,
hence producing a welfare gain beyond the environmental benefits of the policy.
This idea has become known as the“double-dividend hypothesis”.5 Subsidies
have been shown to be equivalent to taxes, by Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
Subsidies can help with the environment, and reduce the price of goods, which
raises the real net wage, which then reduces the labor distortion just as raising
the labor tax to pay for the subsidies goes the other way. This paper shows
that both the gas tax and subsidies to the alternative fuel sector generate
double-dividends due to the specifics of the concerned markets (explained in
detail below).
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) have been one of the first to point out
4See Bunch et al. (1993), Brownstone et al. (1996), and Leiby and Rubin (1997, 2000).
5See for example Terkla (1984), Lee and Misiolek (1986), Oates (1991).
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that the pollution taxes might not raise welfare, as they raise product prices,
which reduces the real net wage and further distorts labor supply. This is
the “tax interaction effect” of environmental policies. Even if revenue from
pollution taxes are used to reduce labor taxes, the “revenue recycling effect”
will not be sufficient to compensate for the falling real net wage from the tax
interaction effect. Thus, a tax reform from a broad based labor tax to a narrow
based environmental tax will typically exacerbate pre-existing distortions.6
Thus, this stream of literature proves that one needs to take into account the
details of the economy when evaluating potential environmental policies. The
contribution of this paper is to combine the literature on the double dividend
to that on alternative fuel policies by including pre-existing distortions when
evaluating the welfare effects of existing ethanol subsidies. I also use data from
the ethanol market in Illinois to compute magnitudes for the welfare impacts
of environmental taxes and subsidies.
Four important trends emerge in the analysis. First, the gas tax and
the subsidies induce individuals to drive less using gasoline miles, to substitute
ethanol vehicles for gasoline vehicles, to consume more of the AF, and to
reduce total miles driven, relative to the initial condition. Thus, in this model
both types of policies achieve the substitution as well as output effects. The
difference lies in the magnitudes. Under the gas tax, individuals purchase fewer
gasoline vehicles, substitute fewer ethanol miles for gasoline miles, and increase
6Other papers in this literature include Bovenberg and der Ploeg (1994), Parry (1995),
Oates (1995), Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996). Fullerton and Metcalf (2001)
also show that potentially subsidies can even replicate the welfare effects of taxes.
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ethanol consumption by a lesser amount. Second, if the initial environmental
tax is lower than its Pigouvian rate and if the polluting good is a necessity, then
the emission tax rises more than proportionately for a given fall in emissions.
This allows the labor tax to fall sufficiently to outweigh the negative impact
of the higher overall price index on the real net wage, resulting in a double
dividend in the primary factor market. Moreover, the higher gas tax reduces
the income from the ownership of scarce resources that further raises labor
supply. The opposite occurs under the subsidies. Even though gas taxes
perform better than subsidies to the alternative fuel sector in terms of welfare
in a general equilibrium framework, subsidies enjoy popular appeal. This is
because farmers are a powerful lobby who are made better off as a group by the
subsidies due to gain in real non-labor income. Third, despite exacerbating the
labor market in my model, subsidies can raise net welfare if the size of the pre-
existing distortion in the polluting sector is lower than the marginal damages
from it.7 Using an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.15 and assuming Cobb-
Douglas preferences at every node of the nested utility function, subsidies
can achieve approximately 40 percent of the welfare gain under the gasoline
tax. This rises to 50 percent in the absence of pre-existing distortions in
the clean sector. Finally, sensitivity results show that the welfare gain from
subsidies relative to that from emissions taxes can be close to 50 percent if
7This is not a general result. Subsidies do not necessarily exacerbate the labor market.
Subsidies need taxes to be raised, but they reduce product prices and hence raise the real
net wage. This latter effect can overshadow the negative impact on the labor sector due to
higher taxes, thereby subsides could either not affect the labor sector or might even improve
it.
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either the elasticity of substitution between the two transportation services
or that between aggregate consumption goods and transportation is at least
as high as 2. This is also true if either the elasticity of substitution between
inputs in the polluting transportation sector or that in the ethanol sector is at
least 2 in magnitude. However, the welfare gains from subsidies relative to that
from the gasoline tax is most sensitive to the uncompensated wage elasticity.
The subsidies achieve 64 percent of the welfare results of an emission tax if
the wage elasticity is reduced to 0.05.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the
model used for the policy analysis. Section 2 presents the differentiated general
equilibrium model with changes in all of the policy variables and their impacts
on endogenous variables of interest. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 examine the effects
of the gas tax and the ethanol subsidies respectively. Section 3 provides a
summary of the data sources for all the important parameters. Section 4
presents the results of the formulas derived in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Model
The simple general equilibrium model in this paper assumes perfect
certainty, perfect competition, perfect mobility of labor between sectors, and
perfect mixing of pollutants from different sources in a small open economy.
The model has three final goods and services. All of these are produced do-
mestically, but only the goods are traded internationally. For concreteness, I
8
think of X as an agricultural output that is always a net export, and Y as
a manufacturing output that is always a net import. The third final good is
transportation miles (T ) is not traded in the international market.
The model has three factors of production, namely labor (L), another
resource that I refer to as land (R), and the third stands for oil or any other
polluting fuel (Z). Thus, the only source of pollution in my model is in the
transportation sector. The rest of the notation uses the first letter of the word
that identifies it such as: V = vehicles run on fossil fuel, A = alternative fuel
vehicles run on ethanol or any other clean fuel, Q = quality of the environ-
ment, C = consumption bundle in utility, H = home production, and G =
government provided public good in utility. Each of these goods may have
any of the following superscripts: S denotes supply from domestic production,
D denotes domestic demand, E denotes export, and M denotes import. For
example, Y M is the imported amount of Y. Also, each good may have a sub-
script that indicates its allocation, except for R since it is used only in the
agricultural X sector. For example, LX is the labor used in the production
of X. Output of XS is produced from labor, LX , and a resource R in fixed
supply, R̄. Output Y is produced only from labor, LY . Thus, we define a unit
of Y as the amount that can be produced using one unit of labor. Then, the
main production functions for X and Y are:
XS = XS(LX , R) (1.1)
Y S = LY (1.2)
(1.3)
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Each of the two goods X and Y are produced with constant returns to
scale. Thus, the number of firms in each sector is irrelevant. The two sectors
are non-polluting, as they both use clean inputs, labor and land (resource).
Even though sector X uses a factor of production that is inelastically supplied
in the aggregate, each of the many firms in this sector can substitute between
the two inputs and thus has a downward sloping demand for each factor of
production. Hence, the aggregate demand for R slopes downward, and the in-
tersection with a vertical total supply determines the equilibrium factor return.
Thus, the factor return to R is endogenous and is a “rent” that accumulates
in the hands of its owners. The numeraire good is L, or equivalently Y .
Pollution is introduced through Z, a polluting fuel used as an input in
the transportation sector. It represents fossil fuel, some of which is imported
and some of which is in fixed domestic supply in amount Z.
ZS = Z + ZM (1.4)
For simplicity, emissions from combustion is assumed to be fixed per unit use
of that fuel. The input to dirty transportation, ZT , thus stands for polluting
fuels as well as the pollution generated from combustion. Hence, an emissions
tax in my model is the same as a gas tax and such a tax would achieve the
least cost outcome of pollution control.8
The model introduces a third sector that produces transportation ser-
vices using fuel and vehicles as inputs. Two types of fuel are used in the model:
8See Parry and William (1999) for policy rankings when this condition does not hold.
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one is the polluting fuel, Z, and the other is an alternative fuel denoted by
XA that is assumed to be non-polluting (a use of aggregate output of X). The
alternative fuel can be used only as an input in the transportation sector to
fuel AFVs. Corresponding to the two types of fuel, the two types of vehicles
include A, denoting AFV’s that run on the clean fuel, XA, and V , denoting
vehicles that run on the polluting fuel, ZT .
9 The two kinds of vehicles, A and
V are a part of manufacturing output, Y S, and are used as intermediate goods
in the production of transportation services. Two kinds of transportation ser-
vices are produced in this model, one is TA, denoting clean transportation, and
the other is TZ , denoting dirty transportation. Hence, TA is produced from
XA and A, while TZ is produced from ZT , and V . Production functions TA
and TZ exhibit constant returns to scale. Thus, the production of T , can be
represented by the following equations:
T = T (TA, TZ) (1.5)
TA = TA(XA, A) (1.6)
TZ = TZ(ZT , V ) (1.7)
The production function, T , could have any of the following alternative
interpretations in our model:
(a) It could be interpreted as a production function, where firms provide a
fleet of transportation services such as railroad, airlines, buses, taxis or
9ZT is the only use of Z. So ZT = ZS . See equation 1.17 below.
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rental cars, using fuel and vehicles as inputs. Some of those services use
vehicles that run on polluting fuels such as oil and diesel, and others use
vehicles that run on alternative fuels such as ethanol.
(b) The function, T , could also be interpreted as a sub-utility function, where
fuel and vehicles are purchased by the consumer. The consumer does not
get utility directly from fuel or vehicles, but from a combination of them
that we call T , for transportation, and it is T that enters utility.
(c) Further I could interpret T as a household production function, where
it is the household instead of the firm using 1.5 to produce services
mentioned in (a) above. The household then “sells” these services to
itself.
All of the above interpretations are identical in terms of equations and later
mechanics of the model. In (a), households pay an explicit price to firms for
their services, but in (b) and (c) consumers pay an implicit price for T for the
services they sell to themselves. For any interpretation of T , I can use the zero
profits condition to determine a price of T that the household faces, whether
that is a price explicitly paid to the firm or implicitly paid to itself. Here, I
interpret T as a household production function.10
10With additional complication, the manufacturing sector could also be said to use a
polluting fuel, and then we could analyze pollution policy directed at the firm. But these
additional features of the model would not affect any of the results below for policies directed
at household use of fuel.
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All individuals are identical in my general equilibrium framework, and
the utility of a representative household depends on consumption levels of the
two final goods, XC and YC , transportation T , leisure, LH , a government-
provided good G, and environmental quality, Q. The household production
function, T , implies substitution possibilities between the two forms of trans-
portation services. If the cost of TZ rises due to a pollution policy, then house-
holds can substitute into TA. The efficiency loss from this switch constitutes
part of the output effect. Moreover, reduced gasoline miles for a given number
of vehicles implies a fall in the ratio Z
V
, while increased ethanol miles per AFV
implies a rise in XA
A
. This gives rise to substitution possibilities between the
inputs to transportation services and reduces pollution per mile.
Since the overall scale of production is irrelevant, I use every variable
above to represent the amount per household. With N identical households,
the total amount of pollution from the transportation sector is NZT . The
negative effect of pollution on environmental quality, Q, is represented by:
Q = Q(NZT ); Q
′ < 0 (1.8)
I can now write the utility function of the representative household as
follows:
U = U(XC , YC , TA(XA, A), TZ(ZT , V ), LH ; G,Q) (1.9)
The individual household does not get to choose the total amount of the public
good, G or the overall environmental quality, Q. The representative household
13
makes decisions subject to the following budget constraint:
(1−tL)L+PRR+PDZ Z = PDX XC+(PDX−sXA)XA+YC+V +(1−sA)A+(PDZ +tZT )ZT
(1.10)
where PDX , and P
D
Z are the domestic prices of X, and Z respectively. By con-
struction, the domestic price of Y , PDY is always equal to one. PR is the rental
price of the domestic resource, R. In the absence of government intervention,
the prices of XC and XA are the same (P
D
X ) since we assume that clean fuel is
merely a different use of the agricultural output. Similarly, the prices of YC , A
and V are the same in case of no policy intervention (PDY ) as they are all uses
of the same manufacturing output. All potential environmental instruments
available to the government to achieve its goal are per unit taxes or subsidies,
such as: a subsidy to AFV, denoted by sA ≥ 0, a subsidy to the AF, given by
sXA ≥ 0, and a possible tax on the polluting fuel, denoted by tZT ≥ 0. Since
the dirty fuel is available domestically in limited quantities, some of its domes-
tic demand as an “intermediate” input in the production of transportation is
met from imports. Labor is taxed at rate tL. Thus, the net wage is given by
(1− tL). Note that the fixed resources (land and the polluting fuel) are owned
domestically in amounts per household of R and Z respectively.
The public good is produced according to the following function:
G = NLG (1.11)
The government budget constraint is given by:
G
N
= tLL + tZT ZT − sAA− sXAXA (1.12)
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where total taxable labor supply for each household is L = LX + LY + LG.
For simplicity, the total amount of time available to each household is fixed
and normalized to one. This implies that L + LH = 1. In this model the most
direct solution to pollution abatement would be to tax usage of polluting fuel
in vehicles (tZT only). Then the question is what other combinations could
work. Several countries such as the U.S. and Brazil have chosen to increase
the number of vehicles that run on ethanol, by providing subsidies to A, and
XA, given by sA > 0 and sXA > 0, respectively. The welfare changes and
the reduction in emission levels resulting from both policies are derived and
interpreted below.
The gas tax achieves all the substitution and output effects. Consumers
have the right incentives to switch from gasoline to ethanol consumption per
mile, thereby reducing pollution per mile (substitution effect). It also raises
the cost of producing TZ , thereby reducing gasoline miles relative to ethanol
miles, keeping total miles driven constant. Moreover, the cost of driving total
miles rises and consumers react by consuming less of it. Both of these latter
effects constitute the output effect in this model.
The subsidies also achieve the substitution effect and provide similar
incentives as a gas tax to reduce TZ relative to TA. The effect on total miles
driven due to the subsidies constitutes two opposing effects. One effect is that
of a lower price of miles on total miles driven. The second constitutes the
effect of the subsidy on the real value of income. The higher subsidy raises
labor taxes that reduce the real net wage rate, and hence labor income. On
15
the other hand, real value of non-labor income rises due to a lower composite
price index. However, the lower labor income has a stronger effect on income,
thereby reducing the real value of total income. This then reduces demand
for miles. The income effect dominates the price effect resulting in lower total
miles driven and hence achieving the output effect of the gas tax as well.11
Next I turn to the market clearing conditions for labor, and the fixed
resource, given as follows:
NL = N(LX + LY ) + G (1.13)
NR = R (1.14)
The labor market clearing condition assumes no international migra-
tion of labor, thereby requiring domestic demand for labor to be equal to
its domestic supply. The final goods market and intermediate goods market
clearing equilibrium conditions are given by:
XS −XE = XC + XA (1.15)
Y S + Y M = YC + V + A (1.16)
Z + ZM = ZT (1.17)
The balance of trade equation is defined as:
PWX X
E = PWY Y
M + PWZ Z
M (1.18)
11This might not be a general result. In cases where T is observable, the output effect
could be fixed through taxation of total transportation services. See Fullerton and Wolverton
(2000, 2003).
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where PWX , P
W
Y , and P
W
Z are the fixed world prices of X, Y, and Z. Domestic
price of good j is related to its world price as follows: PDj = eP
W
j , where
e is the exchange rate in units of domestic currency per unit of the foreign
currency. Since Y is produced using only labor, which is also the numeraire,
implies that the domestic price of Y is fixed. Being a small open economy, the
world prices are always fixed, implying that exchange rate is not affected by
domestic policies. This in turn fixes the prices of goods X and Z.
1.2 Complete Set of Differentiated Equations
To calculate how closely subsidies to AFs and AFVs approximate a
gasoline tax, I linearize the general equilibrium model described above by dif-
ferentiating all the equations. Pre-existing levels of all four policy variables
tL, tZT , sA, sXA are non-zero. However, their respective changes are deter-
mined by the particular policy experiment. In each experiment at least two
tax rates are changed to keep the budget balanced. For each experiment, the
government calculates the revenue-neutral change in the chosen policy vari-
ables for a given emissions’ target. The model then solves for the response of
the endogenous variables to the particular policy. Details of the derivations
are provided in the Appendix. This section presents the system of linear dif-
ferentiated equations, each describing how the agents behave in response to
potential changes in all of the policy variables.
First, I derive the welfare equation by totally differentiating 3.1, holding























Next, I differentiate the resource constraints for X, Y , and Z in 1.15, 1.16 and
1.17, and the transportation sub-utility functions in 1.6 and 1.7. Then, sub-
stituting the first order conditions and the differentiated implicit zero profit
conditions for each of these sectors, dividing through by total income, I, and















where I = (1− tL)L+PRR+PDZ Z is total private income in the economy, and
where µ is defined as −NUQQ′
λ
. The term µ is the dollar value of lost utility
to all individuals from a marginal increase in emissions, that is, “marginal
environmental damage” (MED). A hat over a variable indicates a percentage
change (e.g. L̂ = dL
L
). The percentage changes in the policy variables do not
follow the usual rule, but instead are ˆtZT ≡ dtZTP DZ +tZT and ŝA ≡
dsA
1−sA . The left




As seen from equation 1.19, any policy will have four effects on welfare:
the first term is the (marginal) ‘policy-swap effect’ (Kim, 2002), including
both the revenue recycling and tax interaction effects on labor stemming from
the revenue-neutral effects of the policy change. With a distorting labor tax
12Later, I find expressions for the quantity changes in terms of the pre-existing tax rates
and tax changes. These can be substituted into 1.19 to find dU as a function of tax rates.
Then set dU = 0 and solve for tax rates, to find optimal tax rates.
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(tL > 0) any further fall in labor reduces welfare. This impact is equal to
the labor tax multiplied by the share of labor income in the total economy
and the change in uncompensated labor supply. Much of the double dividend
debate discusses whether this effect is positive such that the higher emissions
tax, used to cut the labor tax, would result in more labor supply and have
a positive effect on utility. The sign of this effect in this model is discussed
further below. The next two terms are the tax interaction effects in the sectors
for ethanol consumption and AFVs. With distorting subsidies that raise XA
or A above their first best levels (ignoring the environmental effect in the
last term), a further rise in ethanol and AFVs reduces welfare. The fourth
term is the (marginal) net primary environmental gain in the presence of a
pre-existing gas tax. It consists of the cost of the policy from the ‘output-
substitution effect’ (Goulder et al., 1999). This is the efficiency cost associated
with substituting away from gasoline to other goods and leisure. This effect
equals the reduction in gasoline consumption multiplied by the increase in the
marginal cost of consuming ZT . Thus, the net environmental benefit is the
gain from abatement minus its cost.
If an initial gas tax exists, the environmental impact term can also be
interpreted as the deviation from the optimum gas tax (t∗ZT , the point where
tZT = µ). If the initial gas tax is equal to the MED, then the envelope theorem
implies that a small change in fuel use (ẐT ) has no effect on welfare and no first
order distortion arises. However, if tZT < µ, then a fall ẐT < 0 raises utility.
On the other hand, if tZT > µ, then the externality is over-corrected, and any
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further increase in tZ reduces Z as well as welfare. The impact will depend on
the importance of the externality (size of µ), the percentage reduction in ZT ,
and the initial size of ZT relative to the size of the economy. The first best
situation with no pre-existing tL, sXA and sA implies that changes in labor
supply, ethanol consumption and the number of ethanol vehicles have no first
order effect on welfare. The net welfare effects of any policy are obtained
by deriving expressions for the changes in labor supply, L̂, consumption of
ethanol (X̂A) and the number of AFVs (Â), as functions of a given change in
gas consumption (ẐT ).
To determine specific effects on labor supply, I need to know the im-
pact of the emissions restriction on the price of TZ , the overall price index,
PJ , the real net wage, and on non-labor income. For this purpose, I follow
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and others in this literature by assuming that
G and Q are weakly separable in utility from leisure and consumption goods,
that the combination of consumption goods, represented by J (composite of C
and T ) is homothetic and separable from leisure, and that the combination of
transportation goods is separable from non-transportation consumption goods.
The separability of emissions from consumption goods and leisure in utility im-
plies that any change in environmental quality affects consumption goods and
leisure in the same way.13 Moreover, separability of leisure from consumption
13Relaxing this assumption complicates the tax interaction effect. If leisure is a stronger
(weaker) substitute for environmental quality relative to consumption, then this effect
is strengthened (weakened). Little empirical evidence exists on the relative substitution
amongst leisure, overall consumption, and environmental quality. Thus, it seems reasonable
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goods in utility along with homotheticity implies that both consumption and
transportation goods are equal substitutes for leisure (Deaton, 1981).14 The
household does not get to choose the optimal amount of the public good, G
or the overall environmental quality, Q. With these assumptions, the utility
is represented as:
U = U(B[J(C(XC , YC), T (TA, TZ)), LH ]; G,Q) (1.20)
Given G and Q, individuals first make their labor-leisure choice. At the next
stage, they decide how to allocate their wage and non-wage income between
consumption of transportation, T , and non-transportation goods, C. Next,
households decide how to allocate income devoted to C between XC and YC ,
and how to allocate income for T between TA and TZ . Finally, income allocated
to TA is spent on XA and A, while income for TZ is spent on ZT and V . The
consumer price index for J(C, T ) is defined as a weighted average of all goods





X−sXA)+βY C+βV +βA(1−sA)+(1−αX−βY )(PDZ +tZT )
(1.21)
to assume weak separability implying that changes in environmental quality do not affect
the relative attractiveness of consumption and leisure. For more discussion on this, see
Espinosa and Smith (1995).
14This is a reasonable assumption as no existing empirical evidence suggests that energy
intensive consumption goods are relatively stronger or weaker substitutes for leisure than
non-energy consumption goods. If transportation services were a stronger (weaker) leisure
substitute relative to all other consumption goods, this would strengthen (weaken) the tax
interaction effects in this sector. For more on this discussion, see Parry (1997), Goulder et.
al. (1997)
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where αXC , αXA, βY C , βV and βA are the initial consumption shares in total
output of XC , XA, YC , V and A respectively. Thus, using initial values of
the choice variables, αXC ≡ XCXS+Y S+Z , αXA ≡ XAXS+Y S+Z , βY C ≡ YCXS+Y S+Z ,
βV ≡ VXS+Y S+Z , βA ≡ AXS+Y S+Z , αX ≡ (αXC+αXA), and βY ≡ (βY C+βV +βA).
Totally differentiating 1.21, I get the change in the consumer price index as:
P̂J = φZT ˆtZT − φXA ˆsXA − φAŝA (1.22)
where (again using initial price and other variables) φZT ≡ (P
D
Z +tZT )(1−αX−βY )
PJ
=
(P DZ +tZT )ZT
I














. Thus, φ denotes the aggregate expenditure share for each good.
For example, φZT is the share of aggregate expenditure on ZT .
The weak separability imposed on the utility function allows use of six
elasticities of substitution on the consumption side. Starting at the bottom
of the tree, the elasticities of substitution in the two transportation sectors
are defined as: σTA =
X̂A−Â
P̂A− ˆPXA and σTZ =
ẐT−V̂
P̂V − ˆPZT , where
ˆPXA = − ˆsXA and
P̂A = −ŝA, ˆPZT = ˆtZT , P̂V = 0, implying:
X̂A = Â + σTA( ˆsXA − ŝA) (1.23)
ẐT = V̂ − σTZ ˆtZT (1.24)
By construction, σTA > 0 and σTZ > 0. Thus for a given number of
vehicles, a higher gas tax implies reduced ZT
V
. Also, for a given number of
AFVs, a higher ethanol subsidy relative to the subsidy to AFVs raises the
demand for ethanol. Next, because world prices of XC and YC are fixed and
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their domestic prices are the same as their respective world prices, X̂C = ŶC .
The elasticity of substitution between the two types of transportation is defined
as σT =
T̂A−T̂Z
ˆPTZ− ˆPTA , which is also positive by construction. This means that if the
price of clean transportation falls relative to that of polluting transportation,
the number of polluting miles driven falls relative to that of clean miles (for
a given number of total miles). The change in the two transportation price
indices are given by ˆPTA = −γXA ˆsXA − (1 − γXA)ŝA and ˆPTZ = γZT ˆtZT ,




is the share of expenditure on XA in TA, and γZT ≡
(P DZ +tZT )ZT
PTZTZ
is the share of expenditure on gas in TZ . The expressions for
ˆPTA and ˆPTZ are obtained from totally differentiating the implicit zero profit
conditions and the sub-utility functions in the two transportation sectors, and
substituting their respective first order conditions.
Next, the elasticity of substitution between the composite consumption
good, C and the composite transportation good, T is defined as Ĉ = T̂ +
σJ P̂T , where P̂T is the overall transportation index. This implies that higher
is P̂T relative to the price index of C, lower is the consumption of total miles
relative to that of composite consumption, C, for a given utility level, J .
By construction, on the production side I have one elasticity of substitution
between inputs. From the production function of X, I get L̂X = σXP̂R, where
σX is the elasticity of substitution between LX and R.
Define w as the real net wage, so w = (1−tL)
PJ
. Totally differentiating w,
I get ŵ = −t̂L − P̂J . The next step is to derive a labor supply function, by
maximizing the household’s sub-utility function for the composite consumption
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good (J) and leisure. In other words, households maximize B(J, LH) subject
to the budget constraint PJJ = (1− tL)L+PRR+PDZ Z. This yields the labor
supply function: L = L(w, Iπ). Components of non-labor income, Iπ include
IR and IZ , the real values of income from land and oil reserves, respectively,
where IR ≡ PRRPJ and IZ ≡
P DZ Z
PJ
. These rents accumulate due to the two
scarce resources, R and Z. Totally differentiating the labor supply function
and substituting the changes in non-labor income as described above, I get:
L̂ = εŵ + η(δRÎR + δZ ÎZ) (1.25)
where ε is the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply wage elasticity, η is







of income from land and oil reserves respectively. If I assume that leisure is a
normal good and that the labor supply curve is not backward bending, then
η < 0, and ε ≥ 0. Environmental taxes that raise the cost of transportation
and hence the overall price index, PJ , positively affect labor supply through
its effects on real income. While the rise in PJ lowers the real net wage,
environmental revenue recycled to cut labor taxes raises it (w = (1−tL)
PJ
). If the
resultant effect on real net wage is positive, then total labor supply increases
as a result of pollution abatement, giving a “double dividend”. In addition,
PJ affects real non-labor income. In this model even if real net wage falls labor
supply can still rise if non-labor income has a positive and stronger effect on
it. The net result depends on the relative strengths of the two. Thus, to
obtain a reduced form expression for the change in the labor supply, I need to
know the change in the labor tax. For this purpose, I totally differentiate the
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government budget constraint in equation 1.12, set dG = 0, and divide it by
(1− tL)L to get the change in the labor tax as follows:















(1− tL)L ˆsXA (1.26)
Finally, I derive changes in production as functions of the policy vari-
ables. From the small economy assumption, domestic prices can change only if
government policies create a wedge between domestic and world prices. Since
no domestic tax applies to the production of X, the zero profit condition im-
plies P̂DX = θRP̂R = 0, where θR =
PRR
P DX X
S is the expenditure share of land in
the value of output X. Moreover, totally differentiating the production func-
tion of X and substituting the FOC, I get X̂S = (1 − θR)L̂X , since the total
availability of land is fixed (R̂ = 0). Thus, L̂X =
σX
θR
P̂DX = 0, thereby implying
X̂S = 0. Hence, given fixed world prices, and no tax on the production of
agricultural goods, production changes occur only in the manufacturing and
energy sectors. This in turn implies no change in the demand for either factor
employed in sector X. Since land is a specific factor in this sector, its demand
remains unchanged, thereby fixing its price (P̂R = 0). Thus, I get the changes
in non-labor components as ÎR = −P̂J = ÎZ . The scarcity rents decrease in
the same proportion as the overall price index, PJ .
Labor is used in the production of Y and G and its price is determined
by changes in its demand in both these sectors. The production function of
Y implies Ŷ S = L̂Y . Totally differentiating the resource constraint for labor
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)Ŷ S. Since oil
production does not use labor, the change in total labor supply is allocated
only to the manufacturing sector. The overall transportation price index is
derived from the implicit zero profit condition in T , and substituting its FOC
to get P̂T = (1 − αTZ) ˆPTA + αTZ ˆPTZ , where αTZ ≡ PTZTZPT T is the share of
expenditure on dirty transportation in total transportation. These results
hold regardless of the policy specification. Finally, I differentiate the balance
of trade equations, to get:
PDX X
EX̂E = Y M ˆY M + PDZ ZT ẐT (1.27)
1.2.1 Benchmark Case: An Emissions Tax
Theory dictates that the most direct way to correct an externality is
to place a tax at the source of the pollution. Since this model has a fixed
amount of emissions per unit of gas consumed, a gas tax achieves this. The
policy experiment in this section examines the general equilibrium impact of
reducing a targeted level of emissions (ẐT ) through an increase in the gas
tax, on labor tax, labor supply, exports, imports, AFV, AF, and lastly on
welfare. Thus, for this particular policy experiment, I set ˆsXA = ŝA = 0. The
behavioral equations in this section and the next are derived by substituting
the policy explicitly into the equations derived in the previous section. The
welfare equation remains the same as 1.19.
To solve for the change in labor supply, I need to trace the effect of
the policy on the price of the polluting fuel, and how it affects the price index
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of transportation, the consumer price index, and finally the net real wage.
I also need to know the effect of the policy on non-labor income flows that
affect labor supply. These income effects arise because the policy generates
real private profits (or losses) for owners of the scarce resources through a fall
(rise) in the overall price index. Then, I determine the effects of the targeted
reduction in gas consumption on tZT .
The change in the overall price index, PJ in this experiment is P̂J =
φZT ˆtZT . Hence, the change in the real net wage is ŵ = −t̂L − φZT ˆtZT . Real
net wage decreases if either the labor tax or the emissions tax increases. The
government uses the revenue from the gas tax to reduce the labor tax, so the
resultant effect on the real net wage depends on the relative strengths of the
two. Thus, the question is whether the fall in the labor tax is sufficient to
outweigh the rise in the gas tax so as to prevent a fall in the the real net
wage in the current framework. Real non-labor income falls by the amount
that PJ rises. Substituting this in 1.25, I get L̂ = εŵ − η(δR + δZ)φZT ˆtZT .
The higher gas tax has a positive impact on labor supply through non-labor
income effects. However, the labor supply rises if real net wage rises. The
necessary change in the labor tax for the government to balance its budget
when it changes tZT is modified from 1.26 to:








(1− tL)L X̂A (1.28)
This policy reduces gasoline consumption and induces switching to ethanol
that raises the amount of subsidies to be given out at their initial levels, raising
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the increase in revenue from a higher labor tax. However, the labor tax falls
if the rise in the gas tax is more than the fall in emissions and if labor supply
rises. Substituting Equation B.4 into the expression for L̂ given above, I get:
L̂ =
1
1− tl − εtL [(ε(tZT
ZT
L









− η(δR + δZ))φZT ˆtZT ] (1.29)
where Iπ = I−(1−tL)L
PJ
. The equation 1.29 consists of three effective terms: the
first term measures the direct impact of the emissions reduction, the second
term is the impact of the increase in AF, and the third term is the impact
of the overall price change on compensated labor supply. I assume that the
economy is on the “right” side of the Laffer curve, implying (1− tl− εtL) > 0.
The first term says that when emissions are restricted, the environmental
tax base evaluated at the initial gas tax falls, requiring the labor tax needs
to rise to balance the budget, thereby reducing net wages and hence labor
supply. The second term reflects the substitution effect of the gas tax. Higher
ethanol consumption also requires increasing tL and reducing L. The third
term consists of two terms: the first part measures the net impact of the higher
gas tax raising the overall price index, and reducing w and L. The second part
of the third term measures the effect of the gas tax on non-labor income that
falls, thereby increasing labor supply. The impact of the third term on L is
positive. However, the net result depends on the relative strengths of the first
two terms vis-á-vis the third.
Through successive steps of substitution (shown in detail in Appendix
28























− sA AI − sXA XAI )





1− tl − εtL φZT (
εIπ
wL
− η(δR + δZ))

















(1− tL − εtL)(L/I) ]
(1.31)




is the share of aggregate expenditure on C, and C1
C2
< 0.
Changes in the various price indices as a result of the higher gas tax are positive
and given as follows:








ˆPTA = 0 (1.34)
P̂T = αTZ ˆPTZ + (1− αTZ) ˆPTA = αTZγZT C1
C2
ẐT (1.35)
Changes in ethanol consumption, the number of AFVs and clean trans-
portation are given by substituting 1.30 in B.5:
X̂A = Â = T̂A = [1 + ((1− γZT )σTZ + σT γZT )C1
C2
]ẐT (1.36)
Given 0 < σT = 1 and 0 < σTZ = 1, the term in parenthesis is negative
if | C1
C2
|> 1. This expression gives the extent of substitution into the clean
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transportation sector induced by the gas tax. Changes in the number of pol-
luting gas vehicles (V ) are given by substituting 1.30 into B.2. Changes in the
number of polluting miles driven (TZ) are given by substituting 1.30 and B.5
into A.9. Finally changes in total mileage (T ) are obtained by substituting
the resulting expression for T̂Z and 1.36 into A.10.




T̂Z = (1 + (1− γZT )σTZ C1
C2
)ẐT (1.38)
T̂ = (1 + [(1− γZT )σTZ + (1− αTZ)σT γZT ]C1
C2
)ẐT (1.39)
The greater is σTZ , the higher is the fall in V and TZ . Similarly, higher is σT ,
the greater is the fall in total miles travelled. The change in real net wage is
given by substituting the revenue neutral change in tL (shown in appendix),
1.30 and B.5 into B.4 to get:
ŵ = − tL
1− tL L̂ + (


















|> 1, then the second term in the above equation has a positive effect
on w, while the third term reduces it. The sign of the first term depends on
the sign of the policy swap effect which is ambiguous. Finally, the change in
welfare is obtained by substituting B.10 and 1.36 into 1.19. Magnitudes of this
expression are computed in Section 3 for initial values of the parameters.
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1.2.2 Impact of subsidies to alternate fuel and AFV in the presence
of pre-existing gas and labor taxes
If the gas tax is not available as an environmental instrument, I exam-
ine the general equilibrium impacts of reducing a targeted level of emissions
through an increase in the pre-existing levels of subsidies to ethanol and AFVs.
Thus, here I set ˆtZT = 0. The welfare equation remains the same as 1.19. The
subsidy combination may be thought of as an implicit tax on gasoline and
polluting vehicles. In Section 4, I compare the welfare cost of this policy
combination with that of the gasoline tax.
As in the previous section, to derive the welfare impacts of the policy
experiment, I need to derive the impact of the policy on changes to labor
supply (L̂), ethanol consumption (X̂A)and the number of AFVs (Â). To do
so I first trace the impact of the increase in the subsidies on the consumer
price index, PJ . This is given as P̂J = −φXA ˆsXA − φAŝA. The fall in the
overall price index due to the subsidies depends on the expenditure shares
of ethanol and AFVs in after-tax income. The change in the real net wage
is ŵ = −t̂L + φXA ˆsXA + φAŝA. Real net wage rises with the increase in the
subsidies, but falls with a rise in the labor tax. If the impact of a rise in
the labor tax does not outweigh the impact of the rise in the subsidies, then
real net wage increases. After substituting for Â from 1.23 in 1.26, I get the
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revenue neutral change in the labor tax as follows:







((PDX − sXA)XA − σTAsAA)
(1− tL)L ˆsXA +
σTAsAA + ((1− sA)A)
(1− tL)L ŝA(1.41)
The first three terms here are the same as those under the gas tax. The fourth
and fifth terms give the extent to which tL must rise due to the rise in the
subsidies. Substituting 1.41 into the real net wage equation, I get:
ŵ =
tL








(φXA ˆsXA + φAŝA) +
σTAsAA(1− ˆsXAŝA )ŝA
(1− tL)L ] (1.42)
The last term measures the impact of the lower overall price index on w. The
subsidies reduce PJ which raises the real net wage. However, they also raise
the labor tax, which has a stronger negative impact on the real net wage.
Thus, real net wage falls due to the third term as long as ˆsXA
ŝA
< 1. The net
outcome, however, depends on the labor supply. Substituting 1.42 into the
expression for the change in the labor supply described above, I get:
L̂ =
1
1− tl − εtL [(ε(tZT
ZT
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The third and fourth terms are different from the expression obtained for the
change in labor supply under the gas tax. The impact of the subsidies on labor
32
supply in this model is unambiguously negative.15
The changes in transportation prices are given by ˆPTA = −(γXA ˆsXA +
(1 − γXA)ŝA), ˆPTZ = 0 and P̂T = −(1 − αTZ)(γXA ˆsXA + (1 − γXA)ŝA). The
subsidy combination raises the relative marginal cost of driving a gasoline mile.
However, it reduces the marginal cost of driving total miles, thereby inducing
consumers to drive longer distances in total. Next I need an expression for the
change in the subsidies per unit reduction in emissions. However, since this
section employs two subsidies, I solve for the change in ethanol subsidy as a
function of the subsidy to AFVs (ŝA) required to achieve the emissions target.
Next I solve for the optimal levels of the two subsidies by setting the change
in welfare to zero. Through successive steps of substitution (shown in detail









15Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) show that subsidies can have the same efficiency outcome
as emission taxes by carefully designing them such that net impact on the wage rate is
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where B1 > 0, B2 > 0 and B3 < 0. This implies that ethanol subsidy rises
with higher emissions standards, but falls with larger changes in subsidies to
AFVs. Substituting for the reduced form expressions of L̂, X̂A (both of which
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( ˆsXA(ŝA, ẐT )− ŝA) (1.46)
The subsidies reduce labor supply and raise ethanol consumption, both of
which reduce welfare. If the initial gas tax is less than its Pigouvian level, then
the emissions restriction unambiguously raises welfare. Thus, the net outcome
on welfare depends on whether the negative effects on welfare outweigh the
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environmental gain. Setting this expression to zero I solve for the optimal
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where B4 > 0 and B5 > 0. Finally substituting 1.47 into 1.44 I solve for the





)ẐT > 0 (1.49)
1.3 Numerical Example:Assumption on Parameters
In this section I consider plausible magnitudes for the various parame-
ters in utility equations. All data has been collected for the year 2000, for two
reasons. Firstly, it marked the end of the first phase of using ethanol as an
alternative to gasoline in all the states at the federal level. Secondly, that was
one of the few years for which data were available on all relevant parameters.
Also, I collected data for Illinois (IL) where ethanol production and usage is
being strongly encouraged. Moreover, it exports ethanol and is a close fit for
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the model presented in this paper. I compare the two policies described above
based on their respective impacts on welfare for a given reduction in pollution.
All variables are expressed as a share of Personal Income (I). The
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defines personal income as that received
by the residents of each state from all sources. Three sources of income exist
in my model: one is labor income (wL), second is property income derived
from land employed in agricultural production (farm income) (IR), and the
third comprises of earnings from oil and gas extractions (IZ). Data for all
three sources of income are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
All income estimates for each state are in current (2000) dollars. Shares for
the three sources of income in total state income for both states are shown in
Table 1.1.
All pre-existing taxes and subsidies include federal, state and local
rates. For tL, the income tax rate must apply to income earned from all
household resources (that is, gross state personal income). I choose the aver-
age federal income tax rate to be 35 percent for all tax payers. Income tax
rate for Illinois is 3 percent on average. State and local sales taxes for Illinois
is 6.25 percent. All of this adds up to approximately 44 percent, accounting
for the progressive federal income tax, plus state and local income taxes, plus
sales and excise taxes. However, incentives depend on marginal tax rates that
are higher than average tax rates. In this model, tL represents both average as
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well as marginal tax rates. Thus, I settle on a labor tax rate of 44 percent.16
The gas tax per gallon of gasoline consumption includes a federal excise tax,
as well as state and local sales tax rates. This implies a marginal pre-existing
gas tax rate of 43 cents/gallon of gasoline consumption for Illinois. Data for
pre-existing subsidies are available only at the federal level. The subsidy rate
is 54 cents/gallon of ethanol consumption.17 The subsidy for AFV includes
a federal tax credit of 2000 dollars off the price of an ethanol vehicle. This
approximately amounts to a subsidy of 12 cents off every dollar on the AFV.
I follow Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) in using their number for the
uncompensated labor supply elasticity, ε as well as for the aggregate income
elasticity, η. The single value for ε represents an aggregate of all potential
workers and all labor supply effects from changes in wages. Russek (1996)
has tried to summarize all this information into one number and concludes
that “the total wage elasticity for the labor supply of the economy seems
to range somewhere between zero and 0.3” (p. 10). Thus, I assume 0.15
to be a reasonable value for the overall uncompensated wage elasticity. I
vary this parameter to test the sensitivity of the results. Like Fullerton and
Metcalf (2002), I use an average of the aggregate income elasticities for men
and women found by Russek (1996) and set η = −0.2. Thus, preferences are
non-homothetic.
Estimates for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
16See Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) for similar calculations.
17http://www.ksgrains.com/sorghum/cars.html
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transportation goods, σJ , as well as that between the two types of transporta-
tion, σT , are not available for the specific aggregation in this paper. Hence,
I choose a base value of 1.0 for both parameters and test the sensitivity of
results to alternative values. Elasticities of substitution between fuel con-
sumption and vehicle choice are also not available. Again I choose a base
value of 1 for both these parameters and test for the sensitivity of results to
changes in their values.
Data for the number of ethanol vehicles (A) and gasoline vehicles (V )
in each state have been obtained from the Energy Information Administration
(2000) and “Highway Statistics, 2000” respectively. The estimates include all
private and commercial motor vehicles comprising of automobiles and light
trucks. Data for gasoline consumption in each state (ZT ) and statewide gas
price inclusive of all taxes (PZT ) for 2000 have also been obtained from the
Energy Information Administration. Aggregate expenditures as a share of
state income are computed according to formulas mentioned either explicitly
or implicitly in the text of the paper.
Finally, I need a measure for marginal environmental damages (µ). No
sources in the literature provide an estimate of marginal damages. Freeman
(1982) estimates that average damages from pollution would approximately be
about 1.25 percent of GNP or higher in the U.S. in the absence of environmen-
tal policies. Like Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), I assume that total damages is
1.5 percent of total output. Expenditure share of gasoline is 2 percent of state
output. Thus, marginal damages equal 75 percent (µ = 0.75) of the polluting
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sector.18 A summary table with all the data for Illinois is shown in Table 1.1.
1.4 Results
A summary of results using the base parameters as listed in Table 1.1
is shown in Table 1.2, for a targeted emissions reduction of 1 percent. Col-
umn (1) shows the impacts on the relevant endogenous variables under a gas
tax. The rise in the gas tax is greater than the fall in the gasoline restriction,
thereby raising environmental revenue (tZT ZT ). Hence, the labor tax is re-
duced sufficiently to counteract the negative effect of the higher overall price
index. The tax interaction effect of the gas tax raises real net wage by 0.0014
percent. The impact of this on the labor market is discussed further below.
The higher gas tax achieves the right incentives by inducing consumers to sub-
stitute away from the polluting fuel and to increase ethanol consumption by
0.0145 percent. Gasoline vehicles fall by 0.0145 percent, and AFVs coinciden-
tally rise by the same amount. The relative implicit price of TZ rises by 0.0721
percent, thereby reducing TZ by 0.0576 percent. Ethanol miles increases by
0.0145 percent. The gas tax also raises the price of total miles (P̂T ) by 0.0714
percent. This reduces total miles driven by 0.0569 percent. Hence, the gas tax
achieves the right substitution as well as output effects in reducing gasoline
consumption and total miles driven.
18This number for marginal damages is close to the 0.77 estimated by Parry and Small
(2002). However, they account for externalities such as traffic congestion, air pollution and
accidents.
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The results of the subsidy combination are shown in column (2) of
the same table. I find that the best way to achieve a 1 percent reduction
in emissions using only these subsidies is to combine a 0.1856 percent higher
subsidy to AFVs with a 0.0741 percent rise in the ethanol subsidy. This
implies that the ethanol subsidy rises by less than that of the subsidy to
AFVs. Moreover, the policies raise ethanol consumption by 0.7449 percent
and AFVs by 0.8565 percent. This raises ethanol miles in a greater proportion
than that achieved under the gas tax. Although theoretically it seems that
since the price for total miles falls, demand for it would rise. That is not the
case here. The price and income effects on T move in opposite directions.
The fall in the price of T initially causes demand for T to rise. However, the
subsidies cause labor income to fall (discussed in detail below), and non-labor
income to rise, but the former effect outweighs the latter effect. This causes a
fall in T . Whether the price effect dominates the income effect or vice-versa
depends on the relative magnitudes of the income and price elasticities of total
vehicle miles travelled. Goodwin, Dargay and Hanly (2003) conduct a review
of studies that estimate the price elasticity of total kilometers driven, and find
it to range from -0.63 to -0.10 in the long term, and from -0.17 to -0.05 in the
short term. Travel behavior of Illinois residents would more likely resemble
estimates at the lower end of the above ranges. Hence, the larger fall in total
income relative to the fall in price results in a net fall in T . When the share
of the ethanol sector rises to more than 10 percent, then the price effect starts
to dominate. However, that is not the case in the data considered here. Thus,
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subsidies achieve all the right effects as well. This result is specific to the fuel
mix considered here.19
The question then is how the subsidy to ethanol and AFVs compare
with the gas tax in terms of net welfare? As seen from Equation 1.19, change
in welfare has three effective components, shown in Table 1.3. Given the
emissions target, the two policies result in the same net environmental gain
(fourth term in Equation 1.19). Due to pre-existing subsidies to AFVs and
ethanol, the second and third terms in Equation 1.19 show the exacerbation
of pre-existing distortions in these sectors. The sum of these two terms is
referred to as the clean sector distortion in Table 1.3. This distortion for both
policies is negative, but negligible in size for the gasoline tax relative to that
for the subsidies. This is because the subsidies induce greater consumption
of ethanol. Given the base parameters in Table 1.1, the subsidies achieve 37
percent of the welfare gain relative to the ideal, but unavailable gas tax. In
the absence of pre-existing distortions in the clean sector, the relative welfare
gain rises to 48 percent. However, this result is sensitive to changes in certain
key parameters as discussed further below.
A significant difference between the gas tax and the subsidy is the
impact on the labor market. The gas tax raises the overall price index (Row 3
in Table 1.2), but the labor tax falls by more than the rise in PJ , thereby raising
the real net wage. This result apparently contrasts with the one Bovenberg and
19Usually subsidies would raise total miles and impose additional welfare costs.
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de Mooij (1994) obtained. Starting from an initial labor tax that is positive,
a zero tax on the clean good, and an initial tax on the dirty good equal to
the marginal environmental damage, they find that an added tax on the dirty
good lowers the tax base. The additional revenue from the polluting sector
does not reduce the labor tax adequately to compensate for the negative impact
of the pollution tax on the real net wage. Thus, raising the gas tax from µ
in their model is more distorting than raising the labor tax, as it interferes
with the labor/leisure choice as well as the composition of clean versus dirty
good. Hence, they conclude that given their initial conditions, the second-best
optimal pollution tax must be lower than its Pigouvian level.
In my model, on the other hand, initial values of the labor tax, gas
tax and subsidies to ethanol and AFVs are all positive. Furthermore, the
initial gas tax is less than damages, unlike in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994).
Thus, raising the gas tax has an improvement in efficiency as well as in the
environment (Double Dividend). In addition, the effect on non-labor income
mentioned above increases labor supply, thereby mitigating the exacerbation
in the labor market from a higher gas tax aimed at improving the environment.
Thus, when gasoline consumption falls due to a higher gas tax, it reduces the
demand for leisure. In addition, the initial gas tax is much lower than the
marginal environmental damage (Table 1.1). Thus, the added gas tax raises
adequate revenue to reduce the labor tax sufficiently. This compensates for
the negative impact of the rise in PJ on the real net wage. Consequently, given
that the labor supply curve is upward sloping, L rises (Row 4 in Table 1.2).
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Moreover, non-labor income falls, thereby raising labor supply. However, note
that even after the gas tax rises in this model, it is still far below its Pigouvian
level. For these reasons the gas tax results in a “double dividend” in my model.
Thus, in summary a gas tax generates a double-dividend in my model for two
reasons: first, the revenue recycling effects of the gasoline tax here are stronger
than the tax interaction effects because gasoline is a necessity. So a 1 percent
reduction in gasoline consumption raises the gas tax by more than 1 percent,
and second, non-labor income from oil and land falls as a result of the gas tax,
reinforcing the increase in labor supply.
The opposite effect occurs in the labor market for the subsidies. Raising
subsidies from their respective initial positive values causes the labor tax to
rise by more than the fall in PJ , resulting in a fall in the real net wage, and
hence a fall in labor supply. Moreover, the higher non-labor income effects also
induce consumers to reduce labor supply. Thus, the subsidies further distort
the labor market for the same reasons that the gas tax mitigates this distortion
(Table 3).20 Finally, since the magnitudes of these distortions are smaller than
the net environmental gain for both policies, the latter outweighs the welfare
cost from pre-existing distortions, and net welfare rises under both policies.
However, the rise is smaller under the subsidy than under the gas tax.
20Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) show that “a revenue losing subsidy can be just as effective
as a revenue raising policy” (Page 258). In their paper a revenue neutral increase in the
subsidy to the clean good reduces the overall price index, but the labor tax can be increased
to keep the real net wage and hence labor supply unchanged. The same result could be
obtained in this model if the initial gas tax is assumed to be zero, if labor supply depends
only on real net wage and if gasoline was an equal substitute for leisure relative to all other
consumption goods.
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To test the robustness of the results obtained here, I vary certain key
parameters. Summary results are shown in Table 1.4. Raising the elasticity of
substitution between the two types of transportation results in greater welfare
gains from subsidies. This is because the higher σT lowers the cost of raising
the subsidies, reducing the necessary rise in tL and the corresponding fall in w.
This reduces the negative impact on the labor market. Under the gasoline tax
a higher σT reduces the size of the labor market dividend. Thus, the subsidies
achieve close to 50 percent of the welfare gains from the gasoline tax when
σT = 5. I vary σTA and σTZ from 0.3 to 2.0 since for a given number of vehicles
of either type, lower mileage can be achieved from lower fuel consumption only
to a limited extent. A similar argument holds for the welfare response under
higher values of σTA and σTZ , both of which result in raising the welfare gains
of the subsidies relative to the gasoline tax respectively. When σTA rises to 2,
the subsidies achieve 48 percent of the welfare gains under the gasoline tax.
Moreover, the greater is the elasticity of substitution between aggregate
consumption goods and transportation services (σJ), the higher is the welfare
gain under the subsidies while that under the gas tax remains unchanged. This
is due to the fact that the subsidies reduce the relative price of T , encouraging
greater substitution away from C to T . This in turn encourages greater sub-
stitution into clean miles as opposed to polluting miles, for a given emission
restriction. Thus, a higher σJ reduces the necessary rise in both subsidies,
thereby reducing the distortion in the labor market. When σJ = 5, the subsi-
dies achieve 54 percent of the welfare gains from a gasoline tax. While each of
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these changes result in worsening the clean sector distortion, the percentage
gain from reducing the labor market distortion outweighs the percentage loss
from exacerbating the distortion in the clean sector.
Finally, testing the sensitivity of the welfare components to changes in
the uncompensated wage elasticity, I find that the lower is ε, the higher is the
welfare gain from the subsidies. If ε falls to 0.05, then subsidies can achieve 64
percent of the welfare gain of the emissions tax. This is because the magnitude
of the welfare loss in the labor market under the subsidies reduces as ε falls
from its base value of 0.15. The opposite argument holds as ε rises to 0.3.
1.5 Conclusion
I consider two policy options for reducing pollution from gasoline con-
sumption in the transportation sector. In a simple, small open economy, gen-
eral equilibrium model I assess how they compare with one another in terms of
welfare with pre-existing distortions. I allow households to abate by reducing
their consumption of gasoline, driving fewer gasoline miles, and switching to
alternative fuel vehicles that run on ethanol. First, I find closed form analyti-
cal solutions for all general equilibrium effects of a change in policy. Then, into
these solutions I insert data from Illinois as it is the largest corn and ethanol
producer and exporter in the U.S.
Four important trends emerge in the analysis. First, the gas tax and
the subsidies induce individuals to drive less using gasoline miles, to substitute
ethanol vehicles for gasoline vehicles, to consume more of the AF, and to
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reduce total miles driven, relative to the initial condition. Thus, in this model
both types of policies achieve the substitution as well as output effects. The
difference lies in the magnitudes. Under the gas tax, individuals purchase
fewer gasoline vehicles, substitute greater number of ethanol miles for gasoline
miles, and increase ethanol consumption by a lower amount. Second, if the
initial gas tax is lower than its Pigouvian rate and if the polluting good is a
necessity, then the emission tax rises by more than the proportionate fall in the
emissions restriction. This allows the labor tax to fall sufficiently and outweigh
the negative impact of the higher overall price index on the real net wage. This
raises labor supply, resulting in a double dividend in the primary factor market.
Moreover, the fall in income from the ownership of scarce resources strengthens
this effect. Third, despite exacerbating the labor market, subsidies can raise
net welfare if the pre-existing distortion in the polluting sector is lower than
the marginal damages from it. This welfare rise from the subsidies can be
approximately 40 percent of that under the gasoline tax, and 50 percent in the
absence of pre-existing distortions in the clean sector, when the subsidies are
chosen optimally. Finally, sensitivity results show that the welfare gain from
subsidies relative to that from the emissions tax can be at least 50 percent if
either the elasticity of substitution between the two transportation services or
that between aggregate consumption goods and the transportation sector is
greater than one. This outcome can also be achieved if either the elasticity
of substitution between inputs in the polluting transportation sector or that
in the ethanol sector is at least as high as 2. However, the welfare gains
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from subsidies relative to that from the gasoline tax is most sensitive to the
uncompensated wage elasticity. The subsidies achieve 64 percent of the welfare
results of an emission tax if the wage elasticity is reduced to 0.05.
Thus, given the parameters of a representative state in the Midwest,
this paper shows that ethanol and AFV subsidies encourage similar abatement
effects to a gas tax. As long as the the wage elasticity is low enough and
adequate substitution possibilities exist between the clean and polluting fuel,
subsidies can achieve at least 50 percent of the welfare gains from the gas tax.
Moreover, subsidies increase the income of the owners of scarce resources such
as land and oil reserves. Thus, if they reside in a state that exports an AF
and belong to strong lobbying groups, then subsidies might be more politically
acceptable than gas taxes to achieve an environmental goal.
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Table 1.1: Base Parameter Values
Definitions Symbols Illinois
Gas Price (Dollar/gallon) PZT + tZT 1.55
Ethanol (E-85) price (Dollar/gallon) PXA 2.16
Gas tax (Dollar/gallon) tZT 0.43
Ethanol Subsidy (Dollar/gallon) sXA 0.54
Subsidy on AFVs (Dollar/gallon) sA 0.12
Labor income tax tL 0.44
Uncompensated wage elasticity ε 0.15
Elast. of substitution in TZ σTZ 1.0
Elast. of substitution in TA σTA 1.0
Elast. of substitution in T σT 1.0
Elast. of substitution in J σJ 1.0
Labor supply income elasticity η -0.20
Marginal Environmental Damages µ 0.75
Share of rental income in GSP θR 0.007
Share of Gas consumption in GSP φZT 0.02
Share of labor income in GSP φL 0.49
Share of TZ in GSP φTZ 0.47
Share of TA in GSP φTA 0.0001
Share of C in GSP φL 0.53
Share of T in GSP φT 0.47
Share of V in GSP φV 0.37
Share of AFVs in GSP φA 0.0003
Share of E-85 in GSP φXA 0.0001
Share of gas in TZ γZT 0.05
Share of E-85 in in TA γXA 0.57
Share of TZ in T αTZ 0.99
The variables in the above table are defined as follows: V stands for vehicles that run
on gasoline, TZ is gasoline miles, TA is ethanol miles, T is total miles driven, C is all
consumption goods, and J is a composite of consumption and non-consumption goods.
E-85 is an alternative fuel mix that constitutes 85 percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline,
but stands for pure ethanol in my model, GSP is the gross state domestic product of
Illinois, and AFVs stand for alternative fuel vehicles.
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Table 1.2: Impacts of two different policies, each designed to reduce gasoline
consumption by 1 percent
Row No Variables Gas Tax Subsidies
1 ˆtZT 1.0145 0
ˆsXA 0 0.0741
ŝA 0 0.1856
2 ˆsXA/ŝA - 0.40
3 P̂J 0.0196 -0.0091
4 L̂ 0.0063 -0.0038
5 t̂L -0.021 0.0294
6 ŵ 0.0014 -0.0204
7 V̂ -0.00145 -1.0
8 T̂Z -0.0576 -1.0
9 ˆPTZ 0.0721 0
10 P̂T 0.0714 -0.0003
11 T̂A 0.0145 0.7651
12 ˆPTA 0 -0.0271
13 T̂ -0.0569 -0.9824
14 Ĉ 0.0145 -1.0
15 ÎR = ÎZ -0.0196 0.0091
16 X̂A 0.0145 0.7449
17 Â 0.0145 0.8565
18 dU/λI 0.0059 0.0022
A hat over a variable indicates a percentage change (e.g. L̂ = dLL ). All variables in this
table, except the policy variables, have been expressed in this manner. Thus, if L̂ = 0.0063
under a particular policy regime, it means that the effect of reducing gasoline consumption
by 1 percent (ẐT = −1.0) under the gas tax increases labor supply by 0.0063 percent. The
percentage changes in the policy variables do not follow the usual rule, but instead are
ˆtZT ≡ dtZTP DZ +tZT and ŝA ≡
dsA
1−sA . This means for a 1 percent reduction in gasoline
consumption, the gas tax must rise by 1.015 percent of gasoline price. The variable, dUλI , is
the dollar value of the change in welfare, expressed as a function of total income.
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Table 1.3: Welfare Impacts under two different policies, each aims for a 1
percent cut in gasoline consumption
Row No. Distortion Gas Tax Subsidies
1 Labor Distortion 0.0019 -0.0011
2 Environmental Gain 0.004 0.004
3 Clean sector Distortion -0.00013 -0.00066
4 Net Welfare Effect 0.0059 0.0022
The above terms are defined as follows: Labor distortion (or “policy-swap effect”) is
tLL
I L̂, Clean Sector Distortion is − sXAXAI X̂A − sAAI Â, and finally the Environmental Gain
is (tZT−µ)ZTI ẐT . All data in the table are expressed in percentage terms. For instance, the
number for labor distortion under the gas tax column (Row 1, Column 3) implies that
achieving the cut in gasoline consumption through this policy contributes to a 0.0019
percent increase in welfare by reducing pre-existing distortions in the labor sector. Also,
note that the net welfare effect of the gasoline tax is 0.0059 percent of total state income,
while that under the subsidies is 0.0022 percent.
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Table 1.4: Sensitivity Impacts on welfare in Illinois (Percentage changes)
Lab Dist. Clean Dist. Welfare Ws/Wt
Param. Values Tax Sub. Tax Sub. Tax Sub.
σT 2.0 .0018 -.0006 -.00003 -.0006 .0057 .0027 .48
3.0 .0017 -.0006 -.00004 -.0007 .0056 .0027 .48
4.0 .0016 -.0006 -.00005 -.0007 .0056 .0027 .49
5.0 .0015 -.0005 -.00007 -.0007 .0055 .0027 .50
σJ 2.0 .0019 -.0004 -.00001 -.0008 .0059 .0028 .48
3.0 .0019 -.0004 -.00001 -.0008 .0059 .0028 .48
4.0 .0019 -.0003 -.00001 -.0008 .0059 .0029 .50
5.0 .0019 -.0001 -.00001 -.0007 .0059 .0031 .54
σTA 0.30 .0019 -.0011 -.00001 -.0047 .0059 -.0018 -
0.50 .0019 -.0011 -.00001 -.0035 .0059 -.0006 -
1.15 .0019 -.0011 -.00001 -.0004 .0059 .0025 .42
1.20 .0019 -.0011 -.00001 -.0002 .0059 .0026 .45
1.50 .0019 -.0011 -.00001 -.0001 .0059 .0027 .46
2.00 .0019 -.0011 -.00001 -.0000 .0059 .0028 .48
σTZ 0.30 .006 -.001 -.00005 -.001 .0096 .0022 .23
0.50 .004 -.001 -.00003 -.001 .0075 .0022 .30
1.15 .002 -.001 -.00001 -.001 .0056 .0022 .39
1.20 .002 -.001 -.00001 -.001 .0056 .0022 .39
1.50 .0013 -.0012 -.00001 -.0007 .0053 .0022 .42
2.00 .001 -.0012 .00000 -.0007 .005 .0022 .44
ε 0.05 .0006 -.0004 -.0001 -.0007 .0046 .0029 .64
0.10 .0012 -.0008 -.00001 -.0007 .0052 .0026 .49
0.20 .0025 -.0015 -.00001 -.0007 .0065 .0018 .28
0.30 .0038 -.0021 -.00001 -.0007 .0077 .0011 .15
Sub. stands for the combination of subsidies to ethanol and ethanol-fuelled vehicles.
Labor distortion (or “policy-swap effect”) is tLLI L̂, Clean Sector Distortion is
− sXAXAI X̂A − sAAI Â, and finally the Environmental Gain is (tZT−µ)ZTI ẐT . Thus, all
variables in the above table are expressed as percentages of total state income, I. Welfare
calculations are a sum of all these effects, including an environmental gain of 0.004..
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Study to Evaluate Vehicle
Emission Policies in India
India faces serious environmental problems in the wake of growing ur-
banization and an increasing population. Metropolitan cities such as Delhi,
Mumbai, Chennai, Bangalore, and Kolkata are amongst the most polluted
cities in the world, and their air quality continues to worsen as the country
grows at an average annual rate of 8 percent. One of the pressing concerns for
poor air quality in these and other urban areas in India arises from the burning
of fossil fuels that emit regional pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), and
local pollutants such as carbon monoxide (CO), nitrous oxides (NOx), and hy-
drocarbons (HC). These react with sunlight to cause health-damaging ozone
(O3). This paper restricts attention to local pollutants due to unavailability of
data on global and regional pollutants. Until recently the lack of reliable data
has hindered any study examining the impact of vehicle emission policies in
place. The automobile sector in India is one of the major contributors to local
air pollution. In 1996 the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) recorded
CO concentration at some of the congested traffic intersections around the
country and found it to have increased by 92 percent over it’s values in 1989.
In November 1996, the automobile sector was responsible for 64 percent of
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total air pollution in Delhi, 52 percent in Mumbai and 30 per cent in Kolkata
(Agarwal (1996)). In urban areas personal vehicles contribute 27 percent of ni-
trogen oxides (NOx), 74 percent of CO, and 11 percent of hydrocarbon (HC)
emissions. Moreover, in 2001 the total registered number of these vehicles has
grown by 62 percent from their respective values in 1996.1
The purpose of this paper is to estimate in India how alternative market
based environmental policies such as taxes on emissions, gasoline consumption
and distance traveled abate vehicle emissions. In particular, I estimate the im-
pact of these alternative policies on distances traveled, ownership of old and
new vehicles and how they in turn affect emissions. To measure these effects,
I use six years of data from 1996-2001 for the 35 states and union territories
of India to estimate the demand system for ownership of various automobiles
and kilometers driven for various categories of privately owned vehicles. I use
the estimated parameters to calculate elasticities of each different type of ve-
hicle for percentage changes in gasoline price per unit distance traveled and
in vehicle prices. I also compute income and price elasticities for gasoline con-
sumption and examine how effective each of these policies are in improving
local air quality. Finally, I conduct simulations for polices that alter the oper-
ating costs of vehicles per kilometer driven and examine each of their effects
separately on the choices made and on the local air quality.
Two types of vehicles predominant in India are four-wheelers (4w) such
1www.indiastat.com.
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as cars and multi-utility vehicles, and two-wheelers (2w) such as motorcycles,
mopeds, and scooters. The latter type of vehicle is more fuel efficient than
the former. However, almost two-thirds of the 2w on the road operate on two-
stroke engines. This poor engine technology makes them account for 70 percent
of HC and 50 percent of CO emissions (Ghosh, 2001). Growing numbers
of 4w are also a serious environmental concern as their fuel efficiencies are
significantly lower than that of the 2w. Moreover, a larger proportion of the
country’s population owns older vehicles.
Environmental regulations for non-commercial vehicles before 1996 were
very lenient, but have become radically stringent since then. All new private
vehicles were required to reduce their tail pipe emissions of CO, HC, and
NOx from their respective levels in 1990. By 1996, 2w had to reduce their
CO emissions to 36 percent, and then to 70 percent below their 1990 levels
by 2000. The regulation also required 2w to reduce their HC emissions to
55 percent below their 1990 levels by the year 2000. In addition, 4w were
regulated to reduce CO emissions by 58 percent and HC emissions by 73
percent by 2000.2 Higher gasoline taxes were proposed to achieve these emis-
sions targets, but have been difficult to implement due to political pressures
from non-commercial vehicle owners. In this paper I compare how alternative
incentive-based environmental policies in India can reduce emissions through
their impacts on usage as well as ownership of the different types of vehicles.
2Society for Indian Automobile Manufactures, 2001
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The least cost abatement instrument to achieve targeted reductions in
emissions is an incentive based mechanism such as a pollution tax or permit
system (Pigou, 1920). A price per unit of emissions provides all the right
incentives to reduce emissions through the cheapest means such as lower usage
of their polluting automobiles or purchasing cleaner ones in the long run.
Unfortunately, however, for mobile sources such as automobiles, the technology
to measure tail pipe emissions correctly is still unavailable. Thus, an emissions
tax continues to be an infeasible, albeit ideal policy against which to measure
the impacts of all other policies.
While inadequate technology prevents the use of instruments such as
a per-unit tax on vehicle emissions, it does not necessarily preclude the use
of other market based instruments that might achieve the same goal. This
paper investigates how closely alternative policies such as taxes on gasoline or
on distance emulate an emissions tax. Existing taxes in India include annual
registration fees on vehicles, and gasoline taxes. Recently much attention has
been paid with regard to how existing taxes might best be changed to meet
the environmental goal.
Several papers have investigated the impact of market incentives that
could be used instead of a unit tax on vehicle emissions. However, these studies
obtained their parameters through calibrations rather than estimations.3 Sev-
eral other papers have estimated models of discrete choice among vehicle types
3For examples, see Eskeland and Devarajan (1996), Innes (1996), Kohn (1996), Plaut
(1998), Sevigny (1998), Fullerton and West (2000, 2002).
55
incorporating the joint decision of discrete vehicle choice and distance traveled
conditional on the particular vehicle bundle chosen.4 The contribution of this
paper is to estimate for India price and income elasticities for various discrete
vehicle choices as well as that for continuous demand for distance traveled
incorporating the interrelatedness between these two decisions. To the best
of my knowledge, no study to date has used an Indian data set for years as
recent as 1996-2001 to conduct this type of estimation.
The main results are summarized as follows: First, Continuous choice
own-price elasticities are higher in 4w relative to 2w, but higher for older ve-
hicles relative to newer ones, within each category. Second, discrete choice
own-price elasticities with respect to capital cost are higher for 2w relative to
4w, and older vehicles of each type are more sensitive to higher vehicle prices
relative to their newer counterparts. Third, income elasticities for discrete
vehicle choices are all positive and greater than unity. Thus, higher income
encourages purchase of newer vehicles of each types. Moreover, usage of vehi-
cles rises with income, conditional on the particular vehicle choice. Finally, I
conduct simulations that alter the price per kilometer faced by adding either
an additional gas tax, a distance tax or an emissions tax. Results show that
a distance tax reduces vehicle kilometers traveled the most, followed by an
emissions tax and lastly by the gas tax. However, local emissions are reduced
the most by an emissions tax, followed by a distance tax and then by a gasoline
4For examples, see McFadden (1979), Train (1986), Brownstone et al (1996), Goldberg
(1998), Brownstone and Train (1999), and other papers reviewed in Mcfadden (2001).
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tax.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the model that
I use to estimate parameters for discrete and continuous choices. Section 2
describes the data in detail, including modifications made to it for estimation
purposes. Section 3 presents the results, including the elasticities for both
types of choices. Section 4 conducts simulations of policies that change the
price per kilometer and presents findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2.1 Model
In this section, I present the model used to estimate a household’s dis-
crete decision regarding vehicle bundles and its continuous choice for distance
traveled. The framework used in this paper is analogous to the one developed
by Dubin and McFadden (1984). I specify a functional form for the indirect
utility function conditional on vehicle choice, and then derive the continuous
demand for vehicle kilometers traveled (V KT ). Most models estimating dis-
crete and continuous choices use micro-level data on households, but Fullerton,
Gan and Hatori (FGH, 2005) use prefecture level data for Japan for 3 years.
Since no individual household data exists for India, I follow FGH (2005) and
use an aggregate data set available for India at the level of the states and union
territories to estimate the parameters of my model and conduct policy simu-
lations. Households face a discrete decision to choose from K different vehicle
bundles based on type and vintage. In my paper this includes first choos-
ing between two types of vehicles predominant in India, namely two-wheelers
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(2w) and four-wheelers (4w). Next, households choose the vintage of their
chosen vehicle classified as old (denoted old) and new (denoted new). This
gives 5 mutually exclusive and exhaustive vehicle types, including the outside
option of not purchasing a vehicle at all. Thus, the bundles can be completely
described by the following subscripts: (2wn, 2wo, 4wn, 4wo, 0 ), where 0 de-
notes the zero-vehicle bundle. Substitution between new and used vehicles
makes it possible to derive how existing policies affect the vehicle composition
through changes in vintage choices and new car purchase decisions. Given
vehicle choice i, consumers have to allocate a fixed annual income y between
V KT and another consumption good c. Thus, consumers maximize a direct




V KTi + ci = y − ki (2.1)
where pg is the price in Rupees per liter of gasoline consumed, kpli is the
fuel efficiency of vehicle type i in kilometers per liter. Thus, pi ≡ pg/kpli is
the price per kilometer faced by households that chose vehicle bundle i. The
annualized cost of the particular vehicle bundle chosen is given by ki. In this
model, annualized cost of new vehicles are calculated from vehicle prices and
the estimated average life of typical 2w and 4w.
To derive the model for estimation purposes, a functional form for
the conditional indirect utility is specified. The choice of a vehicle bundle
and the conditional demand for kilometers driven is analogous to Dubin and
McFadden’s (1984) paper on estimating parameters for choice of appliance
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and conditional demand for electricity. They assume a functional form for
their conditional indirect utility, and derive the demand for electricity that is
linear in prices and net income, conditional on the particular appliance chosen.
Goldberg (1998) and West (2004) follow their methodology in estimating the
conditional demand for distance. They include a price per kilometer that is
conditional on the choice of vehicle bundle. I adopt their approach, using the
following functional form for the conditional indirect utility function:
Vi = (α0i +
α1i
β
+ α1ipi + β(y − ki) + x′γ + η)e−βpi + εi (2.2)
where i indexes the vehicle type alternatives, x is a vector of of household char-
acteristics, and η stands for unobserved consumer characteristics. In addition,
α0i is a bundle specific constant, while α1, β, and the vector γ are parameters
to be estimated. The error term, εi reflects unobserved vehicle attributes and
is assumed to be distributed independently and identically according to the ex-
treme value distribution. The above equation allows the price per kilometer to
affect utility differently across vehicle types. For instance, a higher petrol tax
increases the cost per kilometer more in 4w relative to the more fuel efficient
2w. While this might discourage driving in 4w, however, it might increase
driving in the 2w if households have the ability to substitute between them.
This might exacerbate air pollution in India as the majority of existing 2w
operate on two-stroke engines that are significant contributors to CO and HC
emissions. Indirect utility from the no-vehicle option is normalized to zero.
Given this utility specification, demand for continuous VKT is derived using
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= α0i + α1ipi + β(y − ki) + x′γ + η (2.3)
where VKT denotes distance in vehicle i as measured by the kilometers driven
in that vehicle in a specific time interval. As mentioned by Goldberg (1998),
the presence of the vehicle specific term e−βpi in equation 2.2 complicates
the specification. This is because it is multiplied by the error term of the
utilization equation, η, making the composite error term of equation 2.2 equal
to: ηe−βpi + εi. Unfortunately the distribution of this new error term does not
preserve the advantages of the generalized extreme value distribution assumed
for ε. Thus, I follow Goldberg’s (1998) approach and apply a Taylor’s series
expansion around the mean price per kilometer (p). This allows the resulting
composite error term to become νi = ηe
−βp + εi. The first term in νi does not
vary by vehicle type, and therefore does not affect the selection probabilities
of the discrete choice model.
As shown by Dubin and Mcfadden (1984), in the context of electricity
demand, the estimation of the VKT equation using Ordinary Least Squares
may lead to biased parameter estimates. This is because some unobserved
agent-specific attributes might be affecting the choice of a particular vehicle
as well as the amount it is driven. For instance, unobserved status concerns
amongst households in India might lead to the choice of new, but the fuel in-
efficient 4w as well as to higher utilization of those vehicles. Other unobserved
factors might include location of households relative to their work place, safety
concerns, or preferences for new styles. This implies that the E(ηi) 6= 0.
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To account for the potential endogeneity for the choice-specific explana-
tory variables, equation in 2.3 is estimated by the instrumental variables ap-
proach, along the lines proposed in Dubin and Mcfadden (1984). Following
FGH (2005), I re-write the VKT equation as follows:
V KTi = α0i +
∑
j
(α1ipiγj + β(y − kj))dj + x′γ + η (2.4)
where j stands for the various alternatives available to the household, and dj is
a dummy equal to 1 if i = j. The correlation between the error term η and the
d′js is corrected by instrumenting the latter with the estimated probabilities
P̂j obtained from the discrete choice model along with the other independent
variables as instruments.
I assume that households choose alternative i if and only if the indi-
rect utility function from that choice is higher than for any other alternative.
Consequently, the probability of alternative i being chosen is:
Pi = Prob(Vi(pi, y, ki, x) > Vj(pj, y, kj, x)for all j in K, j 6= i) (2.5)
Substituting the formula for the extreme value distribution in 2.5, I get choice
probabilities that are given by the logit formulas. To specify functional forms
for these probabilities, I need to account for unobserved vehicle and household
characteristics. Adding an error term, ui, to the derived logit probabilities, I
estimate the discrete choice model using the following equation:
Pi = P̂i + ui =
exp(Vi)∑K
j exp(Vj) + 1
+ ui (2.6)
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The error term ui reflects the difference between observed shares for each ve-
hicle bundle and its predicted share and is assumed to be distributed indepen-
dently across choices and individual observations. Equation 2.6 is estimated
using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Using the estimation results,
I solve for the predicted shares of choosing bundle i as P̂i. These predicted
probabilities are substituted for the choice specific dummies in equation 2.4 to
estimate the parameters affecting VKT chosen by each household in the data.
The parameters are discussed in further detail in the Results section below.5
The results are used to calculate several different measures of elasticity
for discrete as well as continuous choices. Using the notation of FGH (2005), I
let zi denote either ki or pi. Then the own- and cross-price elasticities for the
discrete probabilities are as follows:

















The formula for cross-price elasticities show that the effect of changing either
the price per mile or the annual rental cost of vehicle choice j equally affects
the probabilities of choosing any vehicle bundle other than j. The formulas
5I use a Wald statistic to test the following null hypothesis stating that the coefficients
estimated in equations 2.4 and 2.6 are equal. I obtain an insignificant P-value, Prob >
chi2 = .0961, thereby rejecting the null. Thus, the simultaneous estimation of FGH (2005)
might be appropriate here as well. However, I use the sequential estimation of Dubin and
McFadden (1984), for simplicity and because it follows most existing literature, even though
the two sets of coefficients are supposed to be the same as each other.
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The income or expenditure elasticity, ey, and capital cost elasticity, eki of

















All elasticities are evaluated at the sample means of VKT , y, k, and the price
per kilometer for each choice, pi.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 General Data Description
Household choices of vehicle bundles and distance traveled is best es-
timated using household level data on their individual demographic charac-
teristics, income, expenditures, vehicle ownership, kilometers driven, and each
chosen vehicle’s characteristics including fuel efficiency in kilometers per liter,
and local emissions per kilometer driven. Unfortunately, however, no such
data exist at the household level in India.
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I use an aggregate data set for India published by a variety of sources
such as different government departments, automobile magazines, and environ-
mental organizations, as described in further detail in the subsections below.
Most of the data have been collected and made available at an affordable cost
by a private company called “Indiastat”.6 All of the data used in this paper
are available at the aggregate level for the 35 states and union territories in
India. I treat each of the 35 states and union territories as individual units of
observations, for each of the 6 years from 1996-2001. This means that each ob-
servation describes the average household in a particular state in a particular
year. Pooling data across the six years and after deleting missing observations
for the endogenous variables, I obtain a sample size of 183 observations.7
2.2.2 Data Sources
2.2.3 Household income and expenditures on gasoline
The consumer gasoline price in each state in India consists of two com-
ponents: one is the nationalized gasoline price inclusive of central gasoline
taxes, and second is a state sales tax rate that differs from one state to another.
The average national gasoline price inclusive of taxes is 26 Rupees (Rs.)/litre,
while the average state tax is an additional 16 percent on the central gasoline
price. The Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics at the Ministry of
6www.indiastat.com.
7Three of the 35 states, namely Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttaranchal, were formed
in late 2000, and thus have been included in the data only for the year 2001. Observations
with missing dependant variables were deleted and account for the remaining missing data.
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Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India is the source for the data
on gasoline consumption in liters, the national gasoline price in Rs. per liter
and the ad valorem state sales tax rate, expressed as a percentage of the cen-
tralized gasoline price. Gasoline consumption is expressed in per capita terms
for estimation purposes. Gasoline expenditures are, thus, equal to the gasoline
price inclusive of all taxes, times the total gasoline consumption in each state
in a given year. State-wise per capita income is expressed in constant 1993-
1994 rupees and is obtained from the Central Statistical Organization under
the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, Government of India
(GOI). Table 2.1 reports summary statistics on each of these variables.
2.2.4 Household characteristics
Demographic characteristics used in the analysis for each state consist
of the fraction of residents across age groups (0-14) and (15-59), fraction of
persons enrolled in college, number of persons residing in each state per square
kilometer, average family size per household, fraction of households owning
homes, number of persons holding driver’s licenses per household, fraction of
households with at least one income earner, and the average time spent in
commute per day in minutes. The source for the employment data for years
2000 and 2001 is the Indian Labor Year Book, Ministry of Labor, GOI. Data on
the same variable for the remaining years are obtained from the Directorate
General of Employment and Training, Ministry of Labour, GOI. Data for
average family size per household, average commuting time per day, number
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of married couples in a household, fraction of households owning homes, and
the number of persons residing in each state per square kilometer are obtained
from the 2001 and 1991 Census data.8 The fraction of licensed drivers in each
state is obtained from the Motor Transport Statistics of India, Ministry of
Road Transport and Highways, GOI. The education data are obtained from
the Annual Reports conducted by the University Grants Commission (UGC)
on all households in each state.9 Summary statistics on each of these variables
are reported in Table 2.1.
2.2.5 Household-Owned Vehicle Characteristics
Detailed information on vehicle bundle characteristics is not available
at the household or state level. However, I have information on the fraction
of residents that own each vehicle bundle in each state, including the choice
of not owning a vehicle. State-wise ownership shares of new two-wheelers and
four-wheelers come from the Motor Transport Statistics of India, Ministry of
Road Transport and Highways, GOI. These data are the number of vehicles
of each type that are reported as first time registrations in each state on an
annual basis. The number of old vehicles of each type is obtained by subtract-
ing the newly registered vehicles from the total number of registered vehicles
in a particular year. These statistics represent the fraction of households that




is obtained by subtracting the total number of registered vehicles from the
state’s population who are older than 15 years of age. I divide the result by
the number of households to obtain the fraction of residents not owning any
vehicles. At this stage new vehicles imply those that are less than a year old,
while old vehicles constitute those that are older than a year. For my anal-
ysis, however, it is important to define the vintage of the vehicle based on
their emission levels, rather than their age. To find an appropriate definition
of vehicle vintages, I use an emissions data set published by the Central Pol-
lution Control Board (2000). The National Ambient Air Quality Monitoring
Program, started by the Indian government in 2000, set up a network for mon-
itoring emissions of SO2, NOx, suspended particulate matter, Lead (Pb), CO
and HC. Currently 328 stations around the country monitor local emissions
from new and old vehicles. The program published data on how rates for each
of these pollutants rise with age for different vehicle bundles. The data are
provided for age groups 0-5, 5-10, and 10-15, reflecting the ratio of average
emissions per kilometer (EPK) from old vehicles to that of new vehicles in
each age-group. The summarized results are shown in Table 2.2. The first
row of this table provides data on how average EPK for vehicles older than
a year deteriorate relative to one that is less than a year old. One can see
that emission rates in vehicles greater than 5 years of age deteriorate more
than those that are less than 5 years old. This is due to the fact that emission
norms in India became radically more binding from 1996 onwards. Thus, in
the year 2000, vehicles manufactured less than 5 years of ago were subject
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to more stringent environmental regulation, and hence are cleaner than those
manufactured prior to 1996. I use this to define new vehicles as those that
are less than 5 years of age, and old vehicles as those that are more than 5
years of age. Thus, emission rates for old vehicles are expressed in terms of
new ones. Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics for the choice variables.
The first row of represents average ownership patterns of each vehicle bundle
in India. The numbers indicate that the ownership shares of older 4w and 2w
are higher than the corresponding shares of newer vehicles. Moreover, old 2w
constitute the highest ownership share.
One of the problems with the data is that I have no information on
the age distribution of old vehicles within any category. To get the average
age of vehicles in each category for each observation, I estimate the following
equation:
F ji = αi + βit + γ1lnpcii + γ2cpii + εi (2.12)
where F ji is the fraction of residents in state i that hold vehicles of type j
(j = 2w, 4w) that are less than a year old. Coefficients on the right hand
side of the above equation are as follows: αi is the state-specific effect that
remains constant over time, and t reflects the time trend for years 1996 to 2001
and it’s effect is assumed to differ across individual states. The explanatory
variables are the logarithm of per capita income in state i at constant 1993-
1994 rupees (lnpcii), and the consumer price index of a general basket of
commodities in each state (cpii). A vector of disturbances, εi, has been added
to the above regression to reflect any unobserved heterogeneity across states.
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The parameters of 2.12 are estimated using all 183 observations of the data.
This regression is used to predict the number of vehicles in each state that are
added to the existing stock every year (from βi). Results of this estimation
are presented in Table 2.4 for four-wheelers and in Table 2.5 for two-wheelers,
as described below. The regression for 4w has an R2 = 0.7728, while that
for 2w has an R2 = 0.8602. Both regressions show that vehicles of both type
have been increasing over time with at least 90 percent significance levels. I
assume that the same trend persists in years prior to 1996, in order to predict
the age distribution of older vehicles added to the existing total stock in each
state. Furthermore, these regressions confirm that higher per capita income
increases holdings of each vehicle type, while a higher consumer price index
reduces it. Using the estimates from these regressions, I predict F̂ ji for past
years back to 1980 for each vehicle type, i. This gives the estimated number
of vehicles that are at least 16 years or older for the years 1996-2001 in my
sample. However, some of the vehicles from the total stock are retired every
year. To proxy for the rate at which some of the vehicles leave the market, I
estimate the following equation:
Sjit = S
j
i,t−1(1− δ) + N jit; t = 1997, ...., 2001 (2.13)
where Sjit is the total stock of vehicles of type i(=2w,4w) in state j at time t,
N jit is the number of vehicles purchased of type i in year t and state j, and
δ is the rate at which vehicles leave the market each year.10 Adding an error
10Strictly speaking this is not a depreciation rate as equation 2.13 does not involve values,
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term to equation 2.13, I estimate δ̂ using data on 183 observations from years
1996-2001 for the 35 states and union territories. This rate is estimated to be
0.0452 for 2w and 0.0537 for 4w.11 Next, I use δ̂, Ŝjit (predicted from equation
2.13), and F̂ jit (predicted from regression 2.12) to compute the total stocks of
vehicles in years prior to 1996 using the following formula:
Sji,t−1 =
Sjit − N̂ jit
1− δ̂ ; where t = 1996, ...., 1980 (2.14)
where N jit is F̂
j
it times the number of households in each state. Total stocks of
vehicles are calculated for years dating back to 1980. Finally, to get the age
distribution of old vehicles, I find:
Ŝtm = ˆSt−m(1− δ̂)m; for 6 ≤ m ≤ 15 (2.15)
where Ŝtm is the estimated number of vehicles of age m in year t, and ˆSt−m is
the estimated total number of vehicles in year t−m. For instance, to get the
number of vehicles that are 6 years of age (m) in 1996 (t), I find the number
of non-depreciated vehicles in year 1990 using the δ̂ estimated above. From
but includes numbers. In this sense it is more like a retirement rate. However, it is not a
strict retirement either as it is the same rate every year for vehicles of all ages. In this sense,
it is more like a depreciation rate.
11
log(S2wit − S2wi,t−1) = α2w1 + α2w2 log(S2wi,t−1) + α2w3 log(N2wit )
log(S4wit − S4wi,t−1) = α4w1 + α4w3 log(S4wi,t−1) + α4w3 log(N4wit )
Standard errors for (1− δ̂) for 2w and 4w were 0.169 and 0.249 respectively.
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where Aget is the average age of vehicles in year t, St−f is the number of
vehicles of age f in year t, and Stott is the total stock of vehicles in year t.
Thus, the average ages for old 2w and 4w are approximately 12 and 9 years,
respectively (See Table 2.3).
2.2.6 Average Market Value of Vehicles
For this variable, I obtain retail prices for four-wheelers and two-wheelers
published by the Auto Car magazine. These data are only available for the
five largest metropolitan cities of India, namely Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Ban-
galore and Chennai. Unfortunately however, this magazine started its publi-
cation from the year 1999. Thus, I need to get the price data for the remaining
years in the sample. Moreover, I need to get the retail prices for the states
other than those in which the metropolitan cities are situated. Before imput-
ing the missing data, I convert these retail prices into an index. For this I use
data on sales figures for each state by make and model that exists for the years
1998 to 2001 to create a weighted average of retail prices for each vehicle type.
These are denoted as kn4w and k
n
2w, for capital costs of 4w and 2w respectively,
where the weight is the market share of each model. To get prices for the
rest of the states, I obtain costs of transporting vehicles from manufacturing
locations of automobile companies in India to major destinations in the other
71
states. The most popular makes/models of vehicles are manufactured in rural
areas close to where the five metropolitan cities are located. The transporta-
tion costs represent region-wise truck costs of moving a vehicle per kilometer.
I obtain these data by talking to several trucking companies in each region and
taking an average of the reported figures. I got the cost of transporting each
vehicle by assuming that approximately 4 cars fit in the most commonly used
truck in India, while approximately 9 two-wheelers fit in a truck of the same
size.12 I then multiply these figures by the distance in kilometers between
a major city in each non-metropolitan state and the manufacturing location
closest to it. I then add the transportation cost to the retail price index of
the origin city to get the vehicle price index for each of the other states. I still
need to get prices for years prior to 1999. To impute these data, I regress the
logarithm of capital costs for a particular vehicle type for each state (ln(kji ))
on a region-specific constant, a time trend with a state-specific slope, growth
rate of the state GDP measured in constant 1993-1994 rupees (sgdpgri), a
consumer price index (cpii), and the logarithm of per capita income (lnpcii)
also measured in constant 1993-94 rupees. This is represented by the following
equation:
ln(kji ) = αi +
3∑
j=1
βijrjt + γ1lnpcii + γ2cpii + γ3sgdpgri + εi (2.17)
where the states are divided into four regions: north, south, east and west.
This regression is estimated for data from years 1999-2001 for all states. Then,
12These figures have also been reported by the companies.
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using the estimated parameters, I predict prices for years 1996-1998. Results
for each vehicle type are shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The state-specific
dummies reflect the differences in prices largely attributed to transportation
costs. The time trend coefficient shows that prices for 4w and 2w rise over
time. The consumer price index in each state has a positive effect on prices
at the 90 percent significance level for 4w and at the 95 percent level for 2w.
Next, since the analysis in this paper is based on annual budget constraints, I
convert the market value for new vehicles into annual prices. For this, I divide
the capital costs of new vehicles by an estimate of the service life of each vehicle
type. The Central Pollution Control Board found that on average 4w last for
15.5 years while 2w last for an average of 17 years.13 Next, I compute the
annual capital costs of old vehicles that are new by our definition according
to the following formula:
ro4w = r
n
4w × 0.8a4w, and ro2w = rn2w × 0.8a2w (2.18)
where rn4w and r
n
2w are the annualized capital costs of new 4w and 2w, and r
o
4w
and ro2w are the annualized capital costs of old vehicles. Moreover, a4w and
a2w are the average ages of old vehicles within each type, computed earlier.
This formula assumes an annual depreciation rate of 20 percent. Table 2.3
lists the annualized market value of each vehicle type.
13Central Pollution Control Board, 2000.
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2.2.7 Data on emissions of Local Pollutants
Data on emissions per kilometer (EPK) for each individual vehicle in
India are not available. However, an independent study conducted by the
Center for Science and Environment in New Delhi in the year 2001 published
emissions rates per kilometer of local pollutants such as carbon monoxide
(CO), nitrous oxides (NOx), and hydrocarbons (HCs) for new vehicles.
14
To compute an index for the emissions per kilometer for new vehicles, I use a
weighted sum of the three local pollutants in my sample using the methodology
adopted by Fullerton and West (2000). They follow Small and Kazimi (1995)
in calculating the weights assigned to each pollutant according to each of
their contributions to marginal environmental damages (MED). This implies
assigning the highest weight to NOx (0.495), followed by HCs (0.405) and
CO (0.10).15 I need an index for emission rates of new vehicles as defined
in my model. For this, I use the emissions rates for 2w and 4w in the (0 −
5) age group mentioned earlier for local pollutants, weighted by the market
share of each vehicle in each state. The EPK for old vehicles of each type is
obtained from the statistics published by the the National Ambient Air Quality
Monitoring Program mentioned earlier that produced ratios on how each of
the local pollutants deteriorated with age for 2w and 4w. To get the EPK
for old vehicles, I multiply these ratios to the EPK for new vehicles for each
of the pollutants CO, HC and NOx, weighted by the number of vehicles in
14See Agarwal et al, 2001.
15Small and Kazimi do not calculate the MED for CO, but mention that it is small. Thus,
Fullerton and West assume a value of 0.10 for CO.
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age groups (5−10) and (10−15) obtained from the age estimations described
above. Mean values of EPK for each vehicle bundle are shown in Table 2.3.
Emission rates rises with age and is the highest for old 2w.
2.2.8 Fuel Efficiency of Vehicles
To my knowledge, no source in India publishes data on the fuel effi-
ciency for used vehicles. To obtain this for older vehicles, I first estimate the
relationship between fuel efficiency in kilometers per liter (KPL) and EPK
for new vehicles, controlling for state-specific effects in intercept and slope,
as well as accounting for higher fuel efficiency in vehicles manufactured more
recently. Usually in developed countries, fuel efficiency does not deteriorate
as much with age as does emissions due to environmental policies becoming
increasingly stringent over the years. Since this is not the case for developing
countries such as in India where environmental awareness has gained attention
only since the late 90s, I assume that the relationship between fuel efficiency
and emission rates remains the same for both old and new vehicles, holding
all else constant. Thus, the fuel efficiency for new vehicles is given as follows:
lnfeji = αi + β1iEPK
j
i + β2it + εi (2.19)
where lnfeji is the logarithm of the fuel efficiency for new vehicle of type j
in state i using observations for all states from 1996-2001. Tables 2.8 and 2.9
give the results of this regression. The regression for 2w has an R2 = 0.8731,
while that for 4w has one equal to 0.8274. For both regressions, EPK has a
highly significant negative impact on fuel efficiency. This can also been seen
75
from the descriptive statistics provided in Table 2.3. For instance, without
controlling for other variables, Table 2.3 shows that EPK is lower when the
fuel efficiency is higher within each vehicle type. Moreover, fuel efficiency in
India has improved over time as indicated by the significant positive slope on
time trend in each of the two estimations. Next, I use the estimated parameters
to predict the relationship between fuel efficiency and EPK for old vehicles
using the emissions data obtained for the latter described in the earlier section.
Table 2.3 lists the mean values of this variable for each vehicle bundle.
2.2.9 Gasoline price per kilometer and Gasoline Consumption
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Govt. of India publishes
a report on the Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics every year. This
provides data on gasoline consumption and on the ad valorem sales tax rates
on gasoline that varies across states. Average consumption of gasoline across
all states in India is 522.05 litres, while the average gasoline price inclusive
of taxes is 30.12 rupees, both of which are shown at the bottom of Table
2.2. Multiplying gasoline consumption with the state-wise gasoline price, I
get gasoline expenditures. I multiply the gasoline price (in rupees per litre)
with the fuel efficiency of each vehicle bundle, to get the price of distance, pi
(in rupees per kilometer). I assume that gasoline expenditures are the only
marginal costs of driving. Average of these figures are provided in Table 4 for
each vehicle category
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2.2.10 Vehicle kilometers traveled (V KT ).
Since VKT is not observed directly for Indian households, following
FGH (2005) I use data on the average gasoline expenditures, En, (in rupees
per household) for each state and divide it by pi (in rupees per kilometer) to
get V KT (in rupees per household). Thus, the left-hand side of the equation
2.4 becomes (En/pi).
2.2.11 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.3. Average figures reflect
the fact that the proportion of older vehicles is higher for both 2w and 4w.
Moreover, fuel efficiency is higher in 2w relative to that in 4w. Despite this,
the emissions per kilometer for old 2w is higher relative to that of old 4w.
This is due to the use of two-stroke engine technology in 2wo that reduces
their environmental advantage from higher fuel efficiency. The emission rates
for 4wn are the lowest. Average V KT patterns show that the 4w are driven
almost twice as much as the 2w. This could be because the 2w are mostly
used for short distances, while the former are used for short as well as long
trips. Combining the emission rates with the distances traveled by each vehicle
bundle, I find that the worst contributors to local pollution are 2wo, then
2wn, next comes 4wo and finally are the 2wn. The table also presents some
preliminary trends in the data without controlling for other variables. Patterns
of vehicle ownership for old 4w are very similar across regions. However,
2wo are the most popular in the North, followed by the Western regions.
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Households living in the most populated regions tend to own more 2w relative
to 4w, but also seem to purchase older vehicles with each type relatively more
than newer ones. However, it is encouraging to note that households that tend
to concentrate relatively more on newer vehicles are the ones with greater than
average income levels, and with at least one employed member. Households
that tend to purchase a greater share of older vehicles of each types are those
that own homes and at least have a high-school education. This could be
attributed to limited borrowing in financial markets.
2.3 Results
Estimation of the model described in Section I is conducted in two
stages. The first stage uses a logit specification to estimate the discrete choice
shares as functions of household characteristics and vehicle bundle character-
istics. Then, the second stage estimates the demand for vehicle kilometers
traveled using the methodology described in Section I.
2.3.1 Stage 1: The Discrete Choice of Vehicle Bundle
The logit probabilities in equation 2.6 are estimated by Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM). Using data on each state’s proportion of each of
the vehicle choices, I get the following five bundles: (P4wn, P4wo, P2wn, P2wo, P0).
Due to problems of collinearity, I use the first four shares to estimate the co-
efficients affecting the discrete choices independent of the continuous distance
choice. The results are reported in Table 2.10. The likelihood of owning vehi-
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cles increases for households living in densely populated regions, with greater
income earners, having larger family sizes and with more members greater than
the age of 15 years. On the other hand, the opposite is true for families with
more children, with greater number of educated members and those owning
homes. In India, families invest in children, education and homes and each of
these are considered substitutes to vehicle ownership. Shares of each vehicle
type in the North are not significantly different from that in the South, which
is used as the base regional dummy. However, vehicle shares in each category
in the East are significantly lower than those in the South, while those in the
West are significantly higher. One set of parameter estimates of the discrete
choice model are of special interest: the coefficient on “Price per kilometer”.
It gives insight into consumer preferences for fuel efficiency. These can be used
to assess the effects that price changes resulting from alternative policies may
have on the composition of the vehicle fleet and on V KT . In my paper, the
coefficients on price per kilometer for all four vehicle choices are negative and
significant. Thus, higher gas prices discourage ownership of vehicles. How-
ever, higher net income increases vehicle shares. This could pose a significant
problem for India from an environmental perspective if the shares encourage
ownership of the more polluting vehicles. The elasticities calculated below
(Tables 2.11 and 2.12) can be used to interpret more clearly how particular
vehicle shares change with income, vehicle capital costs and prices per kilome-
ter. The own and cross-price elasticities of demand for discrete vehicle choice
with respect to gas prices are given in Table 2.11. Own and cross elasticities
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for discrete choices with respect to capital cost are given in Table 2.12, along
with the respective income elasticities for each vehicle type. As seen from
Table 2.11, a higher price per kilometer reduces the market shares of older
vehicles more than their newer counterparts, for each vehicle type. This shows
that households in India switch to more fuel-efficient vehicles within each type
when faced with higher marginal costs per kilometer. Thus, if gas prices rise by
one percent, then shares of older 4w fall by 0.36 percent while that for newer
4w falls by 0.01 percent. Moreover, given age, shares of 2w are more sensitive
to higher prices per kilometer than that of 4w. This is because 2w in India are
owned by lower income groups who view vehicles as a luxury good and hence
are more sensitive to higher prices. This is also encouraging for the purposes of
emissions abatement as the 2w in India are the most polluting vehicles on the
road. Table 2.12 shows that the own-price elasticities with respect to capital
cost are also higher for older vehicles in each category. Moreover, for a given
age, the 2w are more sensitive to increases in capital costs relative to 4w. The
last row of Table 2.12 shows that the income elasticities for discrete vehicle
choices are all positive and greater than unity, reflecting the fact that in India
all categories of vehicles are luxury goods. Thus, income raises the shares for
newer vehicles relatively more than that for older ones within each type. It
also raises shares of 4w relatively more than that for 2w for a given age. Also,
the shares of not owning any vehicle falls as income rises.
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2.3.2 Stage 2: Estimation of the Demand for Vehicle Kilometers
Traveled
In the second stage of the regression analysis, I substitute the estimated
vehicle shares from Stage 1 to consistently estimate equation 2.4 using Ordi-
nary Least Squares. Results of this regression are shown in Table 2.13. As
expected, the results show that higher operating costs per kilometer decrease
V KT while income increases it. Households that drive their vehicles less, given
their particular vehicle choices are the ones that have larger families, live in
densely populated areas, and own homes. On the other hand, households that
drive greater distances, given their vehicle choices, have at least one employed
member, have a greater share of members over the age of 15, are educated
and have children. Table 2.14 gives the elasticities for continuous choice with
respect to income, price per kilometer, and capital costs of each vehicle bun-
dle. Income raises the distance traveled amongst households in India, and
the elasticity on average is 0.22. This seems higher than the ones obtained
recently by others in the literature. For instance, West (2004) finds an expen-
diture elasticity calculated at sample means as 0.02. Mannering and Winston
(1985) find a V MT elasticity of 0.04 on average. Hensher et al. (1992) report
V MT elasticities ranging from 0.05 to 0.14. Archibald and Gillingham (1981)
is the only other study to my knowledge that estimates a V MT expenditure
elasticity ranging from 0.23 to 0.47, numbers that are closer to my estimate.
Table 2.14 also shows that higher costs per kilometer reduce distance
traveled in all vehicle bundles, but mostly in 4wo. I find that given vehicle
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type, V KT in older vehicles is more responsive to higher gasoline price per
kilometer. On the other hand, given vehicle vintage, distance driven in 4w is
more sensitive to a unit increase in the gasoline price per kilometer than that in
2w. This is intuitive since a higher price per kilometer increases marginal costs
of the fuel inefficient 4w the most. The own-price per kilometer elasticities for
V KT in my paper range from -0.39 to -5.15. These estimates are also much
higher than those obtained in the literature. For example, Wall et al. (1994)
has a V MT price elasticity that ranges from -0.120 to -0.583. Berkowitz et
al. (1990) estimate a V MT price elasticity of -.21. Similarly Mannering and
Winston (1985) find a V MT price elasticity of -.228, and Hensher et al.’s
(1992) results range from -.28 to -.39. Sevigny’s (1998) estimates also seem
slightly higher than the others and ranges from -.85 to -.94. West (2004) also
obtains estimates ranging from -1.51 for the lowest income decile to -.75 for the
highest. If my estimations were to be conducted at the household level in India,
I would expect the V KT price elasticities to be closer to West’s estimates
for the lower deciles. The higher estimates for the V KT price elasticities
obtained in this paper can be attributed to the use of an aggregate data set.
However, because of the way the vehicle bundles are defined in this paper, these
elasticities are not strictly comparable to estimates from previous studies. As
a last note, the capital cost elasticities are negative for V KT traveled in all
the bundles, but V KT in 2wo is the most sensitive, while that in 4wn is the
least sensitive. Also, V KT in the older vehicles of each type are more sensitive
to changes in capital costs than the newer ones.
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2.4 Simulation
Using the parameters estimated in the previous section, I now compare
the effects of alternative policies on V KT , emissions, and the ownership shares
of the various vehicle bundles. I compare the results obtained in this section
to the current situation that incorporates all existing taxes such as a gas
tax, or other forms of vehicle taxes such as age taxes or registration fees.
Since V KT in equation 2.4 and utility in equation 2.2 depend on the price
per kilometer and the annualized capital cost, I translate each policy into its
“model equivalent form”. Moreover, in this paper I focus on the effects of one
policy at a time. I consider the effects of policies that change the price per
kilometer driven. This could include a tax per liter of gasoline consumption
(tg), a tax per unit distance traveled (td), or a tax per unit of local emissions
(te). To incorporate all such policies, I follow FGH (2005) and write the price




+ teEPKi + td] (2.20)
The existing gasoline tax is included in pg. Thus, any tg > 0 in 2.20 represents
an added tax. I conduct simulations for three different taxes that I describe in
further detail below. The first experiment considers the impact of an emissions
tax in rupees per gram of emissions, te. When this rate is multiplied by
the EPK in grams per kilometer, it yields the tax in rupees per kilometer.
This policy is currently not available, as the equipment to measure emissions
accurately is still not cost effective. However, it is known to be the least-
cost instrument for reducing emissions, and it offers an important yardstick
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from which to assess the merits of alternative feasible policies. I assume that
households are well informed regarding the effects of their vehicle choices on
emissions rates. Thus an emissions tax might induce households to undertake
a variety of abatement activities such as to purchase newer, more fuel efficient
vehicles or to drive less in their existing vehicles.
I also examine the effects of increases in the gasoline tax per liter, tg.
This is a feasible alternative, and I evaluate how it measures up against an
ideal emissions tax per kilometer in India. Finally, I look at a distance tax per
kilometer driven, td, to see how it compares to the other two environmental
taxes with regard to emissions reduction. Although distance is more observ-
able than emissions, drivers in India could still tamper with the odometer.
Theoretically, however, this tax should perform better than a gas tax as it
avoids the “rebound effect” referred to by Harrington and McConnell (2003).
In other words, a gasoline tax shifts consumers towards more fuel efficient 2w
in India, and drive them more resulting in higher emissions. This higher fuel
efficiency offsets the higher price per kilometer faced by consumers. On the
other hand, the only way households can reduce the effects of higher operating
costs under a distance tax in the short run is by reducing distance traveled.
Currently the average gasoline tax in India is 30.12 rupees per liter. I
add a gasoline tax that varies from 5 percent to 100 percent of this existing
gasoline price. The results are shown in Table 2.15. I then average across vehi-
cle choices to calculate how much each gas tax rate adds to the existing price
per kilometer. Using this change in pi, I then calculate equivalent changes
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in the other two taxes, te, and td. All policies reduce V KT , but a distance
tax reduces it the most. Then comes the emissions tax and finally the gas
tax. In the short run both emissions and distance taxes induce households
to reduce distance. However, each of these policies affect usage differently
across vehicle bundles. An emissions tax discourages driving in the vehicles
with higher emission rates, namely the 2w, but a distance tax raises marginal
cost equally across all vehicle choices, thereby reducing distance traveled by
a greater amount than an equivalent emissions tax. However, the fact that a
distance tax performs better than an equivalent gas tax confirms the afore-
mentioned theory about the “rebound effect” of a gasoline tax. An increase of
0.27 rupees per kilometer over the existing gasoline tax achieves a 10 percent
reduction in V KT under the gasoline tax. An equivalent distance tax reduces
distance by close to 24 percent, while an emissions tax reduces it by about 20
percent.
Comparing the effects of each policy on the ownership shares of the
different vehicle bundles estimates show that the least cost emissions tax re-
duces the shares of 2wo the most, followed by 2wn, since these vehicles have
the highest emissions rates. Moreover, the emissions tax induces purchase of
newer 4w and that of the zero vehicle bundle. Shares of 4wo rise only slightly
from their current levels. Thus, households in India shift from 2w to 4w in
response to an emissions tax.
Comparing the effects of a distance tax on the relative shares of the
five vehicle bundles, the distance tax reduces shares of old 4w and 2w, and
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raises that of new 2w and the zero vehicle bundle. One possible explanation
for this could be that much of the benefits from owning 4w in India come
from driving them around as a display of status. Thus, a higher marginal cost
per kilometer reduces the benefits of owning a 4w relatively more than a 2w,
thereby encouraging households to switch from the former to the latter.
Finally, comparing the impacts of the gas tax on the vehicle bundles,
estimates show that the gas tax reduces shares of both old and new 4w. This is
expected, as under the gasoline tax households switch to vehicles with higher
fuel efficiencies so as to offset the higher price per kilometer imposed by the
tax.
2.5 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to estimate for India the price and
income elasticities for various discrete vehicle choices as well as that for contin-
uous demand for distance traveled. To the best of my knowledge, no study till
date has used an Indian data set for years as recent as 1996-2001 to conduct
the above estimation. The main results are summarized as follows: First, con-
tinuous choice own-price elasticities are higher for 4w relative to 2w, given age,
and for older vehicles relative to newer ones, within each category. Second,
discrete choice own-price elasticities with respect to capital cost are higher for
2w relative to 4w. Moreover, older vehicles of each type are more sensitive
to higher vehicle prices relative to their newer counterparts. Third, income
elasticities for discrete vehicle choices are all positive and greater than unity.
86
Thus, higher income encourages purchase of newer vehicles of each type. More-
over, usage of vehicles rises with income, conditional on the particular vehicle
choice. Finally, I conduct simulations that alter the price per kilometer by
adding either an additional gas tax, a distance tax or an emissions tax. Re-
sults show that a distance tax reduces vehicle kilometers traveled the most,
followed by an emissions tax and lastly by the gas tax. However, local emis-
sions are reduced the most by an emissions tax, followed by a distance tax and
then by a gasoline tax. Even though it would be ideal to compare the results
obtained in this paper to results generated using a micro-level data set, the
estimates presented here are indicative of whether a distance tax or a gasoline
tax is more effective for emissions abatement in India.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Demographic Variables
Variable Name Variable Definition Means
Famsize Average number of people in a household 5.535
(0.719)
Education Fraction of residents enrolling in college 0.142
(0.699)
Pop. Dens. Number of persons per square kilometer 992
(2050)
Pop-14 Fraction of residents in age-group (0-14) 0.308
(.0534)
Pop-59 Fraction of residents in age-group (5-59) 0.553
(0.077)
Employment Fraction of households with at least 0.6193
one income earner (1.145)
Marr. Coup. Number of married couples per household 1.0834
(0.312)
Houses owned Fraction of households that own homes 0.7736
(0.1271)
PCI Income in constant 1993-94 Rupees 12,141.66
(4686.58)
Dr. Licenses Fraction of drivers per household 0.1867
(.4415)
Avg. Comm. Average time spent in commuting 67.58
per day in minutes (9.903)
Gas Cons. Annual gasoline consumption (litres) 522.05
(223.208)
Gas Price Gasoline price inclusive of taxes 30.12
(6.52)
N Average Number of Households 6,051,016
(743,404)
“Pop. Dens.” stands for population density, “Marr. Coup.” stands for married
couples, “PCI” stands for per capita income, “Dr. Licences” stand for fraction of state
residents that hold the license to drive, and “Gas Cons.” stands for gasoline consumption.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 2.2: Age-wise deterioration factors for CO, HC and NOx in year 2000
Age Group Vehicle Type CO HC NOx
0-5 2w 1.64 1.18 0.06
5-10 4.89 3.37 0.06
10-15 5.77 3.485 0.07
0-5 4w 2.55 0.585 0.895
5-10 3.359 1.769 1.553
10-15 3.73 1.882 1.562
Source: Transport fuel quality for year 2005. Central pollution control board,
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India. Age-deterioration factors are
defined as the ratio of average emissions per kilometer (EPK) from old vehicles to that of
new vehicles in each age-group.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Choice Variables
Choice Variables 4w-new 2w-new 4w-old 2w-old
Prop. choosing bundle i 0.038 0.127 0.056 0.194
Fuel Efficiency (KPLi) 13.40 66.94 12.64 61.20
Emissions Rate (EPKi, gm/km) 0.674 2.641 0.993 4.698
Annual Market Value (ki)(Rs) 18034.86 1376.04 2386.07 139.59
Gasoline price per km (Rs/km) 5.32 2.49 6.46 2.06
Annual Vehicle tax (Rs) 361.68 91.17 262.46 87.00
Average age (years) 1.34 2.08 9.08 11.93
Vehicle Km Traveled (V KT ) 10889 6275 9296 7235
Prop. in North 0.1006 0.1365 0.1132 0.2177
Prop. in South 0.0893 0.0677 0.1033 0.1039
Prop. in East 0.1149 0.0370 0.1191 0.0408
Prop. in West 0.1105 0.1004 0.1192 0.1362
Prop. of Hhs with 0.161 0.259 0.182 0.377
education > high school
Prop. of Hhs owning homes 0.1637 0.1079 0.1956 0.1563
Prop. of Hhs with 0.376 0.271 0.194 0.446
at least one income earner
Prop. of hhs with 0.328 0.268 0.274 0.122
above average income
Prop. of Hhs in areas 0.246 0.452 0.362 0.508
with above average pop. density
Prop. of Hhs 0.105 0.457 0.128 0.662
> 15 years of age
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Table 2.4: Regression of Fraction of State Residents that own Four-wheelers
Coefficient Robust S.E. t-stat. P > |t|
time trend (t) 0.28 0.18 1.56 0.122
Lnpci 0.55 0.068 8.09 0.945
cpi -0.012 0.01 -1.21 0.261
α 0.548 0.346 1.58 0.117
This regression is a step in the direction to predict the number of four-wheelers that
are being added to the vehicle fleet in each year and in each state. The regression includes
35 state dummies, and their interaction terms with t. Total number of observations = 183.
R2 = 0.7728. The column titled “Coefficients” represents the results of the regression.
Table 2.5: Regression of Fraction of State Residents that own Two-wheelers
Coefficient Robust S.E. t-stat. P > |t|
time trend (t) 0.034 0.013 2.62 0.011
lnpci 0.2744 0.170 1.61 0.953
cpi 0.001 0.008 0.125 0.925
α 0.681 0.261 2.61 0.011
This regression is a step in the direction to predict the number of two-wheelers that
are being added to the vehicle fleet in each year and in each state. The regression includes
35 state dummies, and their interaction terms with t. Total number of observations = 183.
R2 = 0.8602. The column titled “Coefficients” represents the results of the regression.
91
Table 2.6: Estimated results of a regression of the Logarithm of Prices for
Four-wheelers
Coefficient Robust S.E. t-stat. P > |t|
Dummy for North 1.0813 0.2372 4.56 0.000
Dummy for East -0.9808 0.2662 -3.68 0.002
Dummy for West -0.4484 0.1559 -2.88 0.01
time trend (t) 0.025 0.0035 7.14 0.000
cpi 0.0056 0.0042 1.35 0.194
sgdpgr-const 0.0012 0.0452 0.03 0.979
lnpcict 0.1289 0.5322 0.24 0.811
α 1.272 0.519 2.45 0.025
Regression includes 35 state dummies interacting with t. Total number of observations
= 86. R2 = 0.9455. The independent variables are as follows: Consumer Price index (cpi),
growth rate of the state domestic product at constant 1993-94 price (sgdpgr − const), the
logarithm of per capita income in constant 1993-94 prices (lnpcict), and a constant (α).
Table 2.7: Estimated results of a regression of the Logarithm of Prices for
Two-wheelers
Coefficient Robust S.E. t-stat. P > |t|
Dummy for North 0.0725 0.0848 1.29 0.404
Dummy for East -0.0032 0.0278 -2.11 0.010
Dummy for West -0.0021 0.1624 -0.01 0.990
time trend (t) 0.0489 0.0067 7.32 0.000
cpi 0.0023 0.0007 3.43 0.003
sgdpgr-const 0.0152 0.0335 0.46 0.654
lnpcict 0.0905 0.1382 0.66 0.521
α 1.8836 0.738 1.61 0.000
Regression includes 35 state dummies interacting with t. Total number of observations
= 86. R2 = 0.8866. The independent variables are as follows: Consumer Price index (cpi),
growth rate of the state domestic product at constant 1993-94 price (sgdpgr − const), the
logarithm of per capita income in constant 1993-94 prices (lnpcict), and a constant (α).
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Table 2.8: Estimated results of a regression of fuel-effficiency for new Four-
Wheelers (KPL4wn) on their emission rates (EPK4wn), a time trend (t) and
a constant (α)
Coefficient Robust S.E. t-stat. P > |t|
EPK4wn -0.4153 0.0345 -12.06 0.000
time trend (t) 0.0229 0.0039 5.89 0.000
α -4.8453 0.7503 -5.53 0.000
Regression includes 35 state dummies, and their interaction terms with EPK. Total
number of observations = 183. R2 = 0.8274.
Table 2.9: Estimated results of a regression of fuel-effficiency for new Two-
Wheelers (KPL2wn) on their emission rates (EPK2wn), a time trend (t) and
a constant (α)
Coefficient Robust Standard Errors t-statistic P > |t|
EPK2wn -0.7624 0.1475 -5.17 0.000
time trend (t) 0.0151 0.0019 7.94 0.000
α -6.451 0.7835 -8.23 0.000
Regression includes 35 state dummies, and their interaction terms with EPK. Total
number of observations = 183. R2 = 0.8731
93
Table 2.10: Estimation of Discrete Choice Model using GMM
Parameter Estimates S.E. t-stat. P-value
Family size (d1) .3179 .0682 4.662 .000
Education (d2) -.0390 .0126 -3.101 .002
Population Density (d3) .8030 0.287 2.71 .005
Child (d4) -1.576 .9598 -1.643 .091
Employment (d5) .0618 .0208 2.972 .003
Share > age 15 (d6) 8.631 3.528 2.446 .014
Home owners (d7) -2.139 0.507 -4.216 .000
North (E1) .0086 .1509 0.056 .955
East (E2) -.4029 .1158 -3.478 .001
West (E3) .3018 .1197 2.521 .012
Income (B) .9523 .1855 5.133 .000
Price per km for 4wn (α11) -.4640 0.046 -7.214 .000
Price per km for 4wo (α12) -.5047 0.123 -4.094 .000
Price per km for 2wn (α13) -.3134 0.067 -6.924 .000
Price per km for 2wo (α14) -.3360 0.030 -10.345 .000
Const. for choice 4wn (α01) 1.307 0.527 2.482 .011
Const. for choice 4wo (α02) .9329 0.521 1.789 .001
Const. for choice 2wn (α03) 1.229 0.446 2.756 .007
Const. for choice 2wo (α04) 1.129 0.324 3.479 .004
Standard errors are computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix (Robust-white)
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Table 2.11: Own and cross price elasticities for each discrete choice (the four
columns) with respect to each petrol price (the four rows)
4wn (1) 4wo (2) 2wn (3) 2wo (4)
Prices
pr4wn (1) -0.0112 0.0102 0.0102 0.0102
pr4wo (2) 0.0123 -0.3637 0.0123 0.0123
pr2wn (3) 0.0289 0.0289 -0.6985 0.0289
pr2wo (4) 0.1798 0.1798 0.1798 -0.8241
The first row identifies the four vehicle types as new four-wheelers (4wn), old
four-wheelers (4wo), new two-wheelers (2wn), and old two-wheelers (2wo). The first
column identifies the petrol price per kilometer of each of the above mentioned vehicle
types in the same order.
Table 2.12: Own and cross price elasticities for each discrete choice (the four
columns) with respect to each capital cost (the four rows) and income (last
row)
4wn (1) 4wo (2) 2wn (3) 2wo (4) 0 (5)
Capital Cost
k-4wn -0.0051 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038
k-4wo 0.0017 -0.0164 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
k-2wn 0.0022 0.0022 -0.0275 0.0022 0.0022
k-2wo 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0938 0.0012
Income (y) 2.7688 1.6916 2.5682 1.0487 -0.9056
The first row identifies the four vehicle types as new four-wheelers (4wn), old
four-wheelers (4wo), new two-wheelers (2wn), and old two-wheelers (2wo). The first four
rows of the first column identify the prices of each of the above mentioned vehicle types in
the same order.
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Table 2.13: Estimation of VKT using Instrumental Variables Approach
Parameter Estimates S.E. t-stat. P-value
Family size (d1) -0.2748 0.23 -1.2 [.232]
Education (d2) 0.1395 0.022 6.37 [.000]
Population Density (d3) -0.0002 0.0001 -3.79 [.000]
Child (d4) 7.0514 12.6417 0.56 [.577]
Employment (d5) 0.0848 0.0785 1.08 [.28]
Share of households > age 15 (d6) 4.9434 11.2947 0.44 [.662]
Home owners (d7) -5.5463 1.4066 -3.94 [.000]
North (E1) -0.3918 0.3815 -1.03 [.305]
East (E2) -2.4769 0.3344 -7.41 [.000]
West (E3) -0.3582 0.3132 -1.14 [.253]
Income (B) 0.2896 0.0677 4.27 [.000]
Price per km for 4wn (α11) -0.5225 0.2778 -4.36 [.000]
Price per km for 4wo (α12) -4.8583 0.7100 -5.24 [.000]
Price per km for 2wn (α13) -3.7200 1.0511 -4.62 [.000]
Price per km for 2wo (α14) -1.2125 0.0123 -42.6 [.000]
Constant (α0) 2.6152 1.5943 1.642 [.052]
The title of the third column stands for Standard Error (S.E.)
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Table 2.14: Elasticities for Continuous Choice
Elasticities for V KT with respect to: Values
Petrol Cost per km of choice 4wn -1.78351
Petrol Cost per km of choice 4wo -5.1532
Petrol Cost per km of Choice 2wn -0.3986
Petrol Cost per km of Choice 2wo -0.7803
Income 0.22399
Capital Cost of choice 4wn -0.0138
Capital Cost of choice 4wo -0.0199
Capital cost of Choice 2wn -0.0238
Capital cost of Choice 2wo -0.0947
All the elasticities are evaluated at the mean values of the variables.
Table 2.15: Comparison of Tax Instruments
Change in pi (Rs/km) 0 0.04 0.08 0.12 ... 0.70 0.74 0.78
tg (Rs/km) 0 1.51 3.01 4.52 ... 27.11 28.61 30.12
te (Rs/km) 0 0.02 0.03 0.05 ... 0.31 0.33 0.35
td (Rs/km) 0 0.04 0.08 0.12 ... 0.70 0.74 0.78
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Chapter 3
Welfare Effects of Scrappage Subsidies in the
Presence of Asymmetric Information
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of accelerated vehicle
retirement programs, also known as scrappage programs in the presence of
information asymmetry in the used car market. I also calculate the optimal
subsidy rate and compare it to the rate set by current scrappage programs,
and finally I analyze the welfare effects of such a subsidy.
Scrappage programs are often adopted to reduce the number of highly
polluting, used vehicles on the road. In the presence of prohibitively expensive
infrastructure to measure emissions, policy-makers cannot observe the pollu-
tion levels of cars. However, since car owners have preferences over car quality,
the government has some information about how used cars of different quality
levels are allocated amongst car buyers. To get around the problem of unob-
servable emissions, the government aims to remove the majority of polluting
cars by targeting low-quality used cars by using information on which car own-
ers get cars of which quality. A scrappage program based on this principle is
effective only if car quality and emissions are highly correlated which might
not be the case. In other words, if low-quality cars are the ones that are more
98
likely to be the most polluting, then current scrappage programs will succeed
in removing most of the polluting cars from the road. However, if a substantial
fraction of the high-quality used cars are the ones contributing to air pollution,
then the program will not reduce pollution significantly.
Since emissions is unobservable, scrappage programs are voluntary. In-
dividuals are offered a fixed dollar amount to scrap cars that are older than a
certain age. The underlying principle of current scrappage programs is that a
car’s quality or value is negatively correlated to the amount of annual emissions
it generates. If a car owner is assumed to have low utility from a low-quality
car that is highly polluting, then a sufficient compensation offer would suc-
cessfully scrap the high-emitting vehicles due to the self-selection mechanism.
However, high-quality used cars can be polluting as well, albeit with a lower
probability than their low-quality counterparts. Hence, a subsidy that seeks
to scrap only the low-quality used cars might not be effective in improving air
quality if there exist a substantial proportion of highly polluting high-quality
used cars in the fleet.
Moreover, another factor besides the quality of the car affects the scrap-
page decision. Car owners have different preferences for the quality of cars.
A car owner’s utility from a car depends on both the quality of the car and
the owner’s preference for the quality. The allocation of cars to owners with
different preferences matters. The scrappage program will scrap the highly pol-
luting cars with a minimum subsidy only if the automobile market allocates
low quality cars to those with a low preference for car quality, and assigns high
99
quality cars to those with a high preference.
The problem that occurs in achieving an effective subsidy is that the
resale market does not always allocate the poorest quality cars to the owners
with the lowest preferences for quality. This inefficiency in allocation results
from adverse selection in the second hand market. Quality of cars is observ-
able to its sellers, but not to the buyers. This information asymmetry has a
significant effect on the amount of the subsidy required to scrap the highly
polluting used cars. My paper shows that the amount of the subsidy needed
to scrap the highly polluting cars rises with information asymmetry in the
second-hand market for private automobiles.
Scrappage programs have been popular in Europe, and in few geographically-
localized regions of Canada and the United States. Most European Union (EU)
countries offer country-wide subsidies. France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy
and Spain required scrapped cars to be replaced by a new vehicle. Other coun-
tries such as Denmark, Norway, the United States and Canada did not impose
any such constraints on the type of replacement vehicle.1 In my paper I focus
my analysis on the effects of an unconstrained subsidy. Little work has been
done to identify the implications of such a subsidy on the automobile market
as well as on emissions.2 Recently the possibility of expanding such programs
has sparked a debate on their effects on the car market. Adda and Cooper
1See Hahn (1995), EPA (1998), and European Conference of Ministers of Transport
(1999) for a comprehensive description of the different scrappage subsidy programs in the
United States and Europe.
2See Alberini et al. (1995, 1996) for empirical work on scrappage programs.
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(2000) use a replacement-demand model with a competitive primary market to
examine the effects of a scrappage subsidy that required the replacement vehi-
cle to be new. Since their main interest is to study the impacts of such a policy
on new car sales, they do not include an active market for used cars. More
recently Esteban (2005) also analyzes an unconstrained scrappage subsidy in
the presence of monopoly distortions in the new car market. She, however,
incorporates a used market without information asymmetry. Thus, my contri-
bution to the literature is to examine the implications of such a program in a
theoretical framework with information asymmetry.
To evaluate the effects of information asymmetry in the second hand
market on the scrappage subsidy, I use a simplified version of Hendel and
Lizzeri’s (1999) model of adverse selection. The model is a dynamic frame-
work where agents have heterogeneous preferences for car quality. However,
the quality of a used car in my paper is discrete. I also correlate car qual-
ity with emission level in order to study the environmental implications of the
scrappage policy. I first examine the case where used cars’ qualities are observ-
able to all traders, and used cars of every quality have a unique price. This
second-hand market allocates cars efficiently amongst heterogeneous buyers
according to their preferences for car quality. I use this case as a benchmark
to examine how adverse selection impacts the level of the subsidy as well it’s
implementation.
Next I examine the case where quality is not observable, and used cars
are priced according to the average quality of traded used cars in the market.
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In this case, a low quality car could be owned by a consumer with a prefer-
ence for relatively high quality. To scrap the highly polluting poor quality
cars, the subsidy must now be larger than the benchmark to compensate the
high preference owner. If the subsidy is sufficiently higher, some car owners
would also be willing to scrap their good quality cars. Thus, in the presence
of information asymmetry the program subsidizes the scrapping of the highly
polluting cars at a higher rate, and could potentially be paying for the scrap-
page of some good quality cars. My focus is to evaluate the extent to which
information asymmetry in the resale market affects the subsidy and how the
subsidy in turn affects allocation of cars in the used car market. One key
result is that in the presence of adverse selection a subsidy that maintains an
active resale market unambiguously makes all types of consumers better off.
However, if this option of implementing the subsidy does not exist, then the
only other way to induce effective scrappage in my framework is to shut down
the used car market. My welfare implications suggest that it might be better
not to do anything rather than have a scrappage program such as the latter.
Finally, the optimal subsidy for scrappage is lower than the subsidy currently
used to scrap all low-quality used cars.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.1 describes the model.
Section 3.2 analyzes the model when quality is uncertain but observable, with
and without a scrappage program. Section 3.3 analyzes the case of information
asymmetry with and without a subsidy. Section 3.4 presents a numerical
solution to the model, and finally Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.1 Model
I consider a discrete time, infinite-horizon economy in which individuals
can choose to consume either a new car, or a used car. I also assume that a
unit mass of infinitely-lived car owners are born at the beginning of time, and
that no new consumers are added to the economy. Individuals purchase cars
because they value the services from a car of quality, wt. Agents’ preferences
for car quality are heterogenous and are denoted by θ, which is distributed
according to a cumulative distribution function, F . I assume that F is strictly
increasing and continuous on the interval [θ, θ]. Used cars are polluting and
add to the total quantity of emissions, denoted by QE. At time t, a car owner
of type θ pays a price Pw,t for a car of quality wt and enjoys a utility flow from
it given by the following quasi-linear function:
U(qt, θ) = θwt − Pw,t − µQE (3.1)
where µ is the marginal environmental damage from emissions.3 I assume
that all consumers are negatively affected by worsening air quality, but each
car owner is a very small share of the entire market and so ignores the effects of
his or her own actions on total emissions. All consumers at any time t demand
at most one car, and all have a discount factor of δ.
New cars are assumed to generate zero level of pollution. Thus, emis-
sions are generated by low- and high-quality used cars. Emissions generated
by used cars can either be high or low. I simplify to assume that low-emission
3All agents have identical income, y, that I normalize to zero.
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levels are zero. Let high-quality used cars be polluting with probability α,
while low-quality used cars are polluting with probability β. I assume that
β > α, implying that low-quality used cars are more likely to be polluting than
high-quality used cars, and these probabilities are not affected by the actions
of the car owners. Thus, the aggregate quantity of emissions generated from
used cars is given by the following function:
QE = βql + αqh (3.2)
where ql is the quantity of low-quality used cars, and qh is the quantity of
high-quality used cars. I assume that each car generates a constant amount
of emissions, and for simplicity I set that constant equal to one. Thus, the
total amount of emissions generated from low-quality used cars is equal to its
proportion in the fleet.
Cars last for two periods. A car is new in the first period, and used
in the second. New cars may be sold to someone else at the end of the first
period, who then uses it for one more period before its value falls to zero at the
end of the second period. Car quality is discrete, and can be of five types: new
cars with no emissions, a low-quality used car with no emissions, a low-quality
used car with high emissions, a high-quality used car with no emissions, and
a high-quality used car with high emissions. Since emissions from cars are not
observed in the market, car prices are not determined by it. Hence, in reality
the proportion of each type of used car is a weighted sum of its high and low
emissions counterparts. However, since emission levels are unobservable, only
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cars of different qualities can be observed. Hence, from the perspective of the
market cars are of three types: a new car (v), a low quality used car (wl), or a
high-quality used car (wh). All new cars have the same quality level. Quality
realizations of used cars is random, but since the realization of v is not relevant
to my analysis, I fix v to be equal to 1. The quality of a used car is realized in
the second period, and is unobservable to the buyers in the used car market.
A used car turns out to be of high quality with probability p, and that of low
quality with probability (1− p). Moreover, wh ≤ v, so that a used car always
depreciates in quality.
The government’s goal under current scrappage programs is to reduce
pollution by getting rid of the high-emissions used cars. However, emissions of
cars cannot be observed at reasonable cost, but the government does have some
information on how cars of different quality are distributed across car buyers.
The policy then uses this information on car quality distribution to reduce
pollution by targeting low-quality used cars, working under the assumption
that these cars are more likely than high-quality used cars to be polluting.
For this purpose, the policy offers a subsidy, S for voluntary scrappage of
all such cars. However, this policy might not get rid of the most polluting
cars even in the absence of information asymmetry in the second-hand market
as shown below. Moreover, information asymmetry makes the program more
costly to scrap even the poor quality used cars. Consumers decide whether or
not to purchase a car and also choose the type of car based on their preference
for car quality and its price.
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For notation, the paper follows the convention of using a superscript to
denote the case being examined and a subscript either to refer to the type of
consumer, or to the type of car. The analysis examines the following five cat-
egories: o stands for the observable quality case without a subsidy, os stands
for the observable case with a subsidy, i stands for information asymmetry
without a scrappage program, is denotes information asymmetry with a sub-
sidy that eliminates the resale market for cars, and finally isr is the case with
information asymmetry in the presence of a subsidy that retains a second-hand
market for used cars.
A subscript to a preference parameter, θ, refers to the type of consumer,
and can be one of the following: n stands for owners who purchase new cars
every period, h stands for buyers of high-quality used cars, l stands for low-
quality buyers, u denotes the used car buyer in the unobservable case, nk
is new car owner who keeps cars of high quality, and finally a no subscript
denotes consumers who choose the outside option of not purchasing a car.
Furthermore, a subscript on quality or price refers to the type of car, and can
be one of the following: n stands for new, h stands for high-quality used car,
l stands for low-quality used car, and u stands for a used car.
I ignore the effects of market structure in the new car market and focus
on the allocation of used cars and new cars amongst the buyers and sellers in
the presence of information asymmetry with and without a scrappage subsidy.
I assume that the price of new cars, Pn is exogenously given, and all endogenous
variables are solved in terms of it. I also focus my attention on steady-state
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allocations. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 I examine how the scrappage subsidy
changes in the presence of information asymmetry relative to the benchmark
case when quality is observable.
3.2 Equilibrium with Observable Quality
I first present two benchmark cases with no asymmetric information,
one with and the other without a scrappage subsidy. I use these results to
compare the effects of adverse selection on the allocation of low-quality used
cars and hence on emissions, as well as how it affects the effective subsidy
level.
3.2.1 No Scrappage Subsidy
Here I consider the automobile market when quality of used cars is
observable to both buyers and sellers, but the realizations of used car quality
are non-deterministic. In other words, when a new car turns used in the second
period, it could be either of high- or low-quality, but which it will be is not
known when a new car is bought. This makes the resale value of a new car
uncertain at the time of purchase. Moreover, the used car buyer always knows
the quality of the car at the time of purchase. The used car market in this
case uniquely determines a price for each type of used car. The price of a used
car of quality wl is given by P
o
l , while that of a car of quality of wh is given
by P oh . I solve for the equilibrium allocations of both types of used cars and
that of new cars, as well the prices of each used car type.
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Following Hendel and Lizzeri(1999), four types of agents exist in this





a low-quality used car at the end of every period, types in [θoh, θ
o
n] purchase a
high-quality used car at the end of every period, and types in [θon, θ] purchase
a new car and trade it when it turns used after one period. Appendix D shows
that θ is increasing in w. This implies that consumers with higher preferences
for quality choose the high-quality cars, while those with lower preferences
choose the low-quality cars. Thus, the secondary market correctly matches
the “right” car to the “right” customer. I now characterize the behavior of
each of these types.
(1) Types in [θon, θ]: These consumers purchase a new car, keeps it for one
period and then resells it. They purchase a new car to enjoy the higher
services from it. The total demand for new cars is given by F (θ)−F (θon).
The lifetime utility of an infinitely-lived typical car owner of this type is:
V on (θ) =
θ − Pn + δE(P (w))− µQE
1− δ (3.3)
where E(P (w)) = pP oh + (1 − p)P ol is the expected price of a used car
and reflects the quality uncertainty of the used car to this car owner at
the time he or she purchases a new car.
(2) Types in [θoh, θ
o
n]: These car owners have valuations for car quality that
are high enough to pay for the higher price of good quality used cars
relative to that of low quality used cars, but are not high enough to
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purchase new cars. The total demand for high quality used cars is:
F (θon)− F (θoh). The lifetime utility of is:
V oh (θ) =
θwh − P oh − µQE
1− δ (3.4)
(3) Types in [θol , θ
o
h]: Marginal consumer θ
o
l is also the lowest type who pur-
chases a car. Consumers with valuations lower than θol prefer the outside
option of not purchasing a car at any date t. Types with valuations
greater than θol prefer purchasing a low-quality car than not driving one
at all. The lifetime utility of is:
V ol (θ) =
θwl − P ol − µQE
1− δ (3.5)
(4) Types in [θ, θol ]: These consumers get a utility of
−µQE
1−δ every period.





determined by their respective indifference equations. Type θon is indifferent
between purchasing a new car and a used car of good quality. Type θoh is
indifferent between purchasing a used car of good quality and that of poor
quality, while type θol is indifferent between buying a used car of poor quality






θol wl − P ol − µQoE
1− δ =
−µQoE












θohwh − P oh − µQoE
1− δ =
θohwl − P ol − µQoE
1− δ








θon − Pn + δE(P (w))− µQoE
1− δ =
θonwh − P oh − µQoE
1− δ
⇒ θon(1− wh) + δE(P (w)) + P oh = P on (3.8)
Equation 3.7 implies that the difference between the prices of a high- and
low-quality used car is exactly equal to the additional benefit offered by a
high-quality used car.
Finally, the prices of both types of used cars are determined by their
respective market clearing conditions. That is, if the market for high quality
used cars is to clear, it must be true that their supply given by p(F (θ)−F (θon)),
equals their demand, given by F (θon) − F (θoh). Similarly, the supply of low-
quality used cars, given by (1 − p)(F (θ) − F (θon)), must equal their demand,
given by F (θoh) − F (θol ). Thus, the market clearing conditions for both types
of used cars are as follows:
p(F (θ)− F (θon)) = F (θon)− F (θoh) (3.9)
(1− p)(F (θ)− F (θon)) = F (θoh)− F (θol ) (3.10)
(3.11)
The quantity of emissions generated is a function of the proportion of highly
polluting used cars in the market that could be of high- or of low-quality.
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In section 3.4, I use the equations 3.6, 3.7 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 to numerically









of the price of new cars. When quality is observable, the market for used cars
perfectly matches consumer preferences to car quality.
3.2.2 With Subsidy to Scrap all Low-quality used cars
In this section I analyze how the allocation of used cars changes in
the presence of a subsidy, Sos, offered to car owners to induce them to scrap
their low-quality used cars. I also determine the minimum level of the subsidy
required to scrap all the low-quality used cars, and compare it to the price
of used cars in the environment without the subsidy. In my model, the low-
quality used cars are not necessarily the most polluting. Hence this subsidy
might not be effective in reducing pollution if there exist a substantial number
of high-quality cars that are also polluting. Note that a subsidy that induces
scrappage of all the low-quality used cars must be such that no agent has the
incentive to participate in the second hand market for this type of car. For
this to occur, the subsidy must compensate the highest type that purchases
a low-quality used car in this set-up (θoh). Since the used car market in the
observable case perfectly matches the car to its owner, it implies that θoh is the
lowest types to ever purchase a low-quality used car. Hence, the level of Sos
is the lowest at which the government achieves its goal. Since all poor-quality
used cars are scrapped, QosE is the proportion of high-quality used cars that
are polluting.
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Given the above condition on the scrappage subsidy, I have three types





purchase a high-quality used car, and types in [θosn , θ] purchase a new car, then
sells it at the end of first period if the used car turns out to be of high-quality,
but scraps it if it turns out to be of low-quality. Let P osh be the price of
high-quality used cars.
(1) Types in [θosn , θ]: The lifetime utility of these infinitely-lived consumers
is given as:
V osn (θ) =
θ − Pn + δ[E(P (w))]
1− δ (3.12)
where E(P (w)) = pP osh + (1− p)Sos is the price that the new car buyer
expects to receive for his or her used car, and QosE is the quantity of
emissions generated. If the subsidy is effective in scrapping all the low
quality used cars, then QosE < Q
o
E.
(2) Types in [θosh , θ
os
n ]: Their lifetime utility is given as follows:
V osh (θ) =
θwh − P osh
1− δ (3.13)
(3) Types in [θ, θosh ]: Their lifetime utility is zero in the presence of the
subsidy.
Thus, if the subsidy is 100 percent effective, it eliminates the market
for low-quality used cars. In section 3.4 I compute an example of how
the prior owners of low-quality used car buyers change their behavior in
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the presence of the subsidy. The condition on the subsidy required to
support the above equilibrium allocation is given below.
The two marginal consumers, θosn , and θ
os
h are determined by their indif-
ference conditions. The marginal consumer, θosn is indifferent between buying
a new car and a high-quality used car. The marginal consumer, θosh , is indif-
ferent between purchasing a high-quality used car and not purchasing a car at
all. These two conditions are:
V osn (θ
os





θosn − Pn + δ[E(P (w))]− µQosE
1− δ =
θosn wh − P osh − µQosE
1− δ
⇒ θosn (1− wh) = Pn − P osh (1− δp)− (1− p)S
V osh (θ
os
h ) = V
os(θosh ) ⇒
θosh wh − P osh − µQosE
1− δ = −
µQosE
1− δ
⇒ θosh wh = P osh
(3.14)
The subsidy that supports the above equilibrium allocation must be
such that it makes the consumer with the highest valuation amongst the no
car buyers prefer not buying a car than to purchase a used car of low quality.
In other words, Sos, must be such that θosh wl − Sos ≤ 0. To achieve this
allocation at least cost, the government picks the lowest level of the subsidy.
Thus, Sos = θosh wl.
Finally, the price of high quality used cars is determined by the market
clearing condition where the demand for old high quality cars equals its supply.
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This is given as follows:
F (θosn )− F (θosh ) = p[F (θ)− F (θosn )] (3.15)
Thus, equations 3.14, 3.15 and the equation for the minimum subsidy
level determine the endogenous variables in this set up. These equations are
used in the Numerical Section to compare how the market allocation with the
scrappage subsidy differs from that without, and how the subsidy affects the
welfare of the different types of consumers.
3.2.3 Optimal Subsidy rate when Car quality is observable
In this section, I solve for the optimal subsidy rate and compare it to
the subsidy needed to scrap all low-quality used cars. I express all endogenous
variables as functions of the subsidy rate and then plug these functions into
the social welfare function. Next I differentiate the welfare function and set it
equal to zero to solve for the optimal subsidy rate, S∗o (details are shown in the
Appendix). The scrappage policy in place assumes that to reduce pollution
from existing cars, all low-quality used cars must be scrapped. However, the
optimal number for scrappage is at the point where the benefits from scrappage
in terms of lower emissions is equal to the cost of scrappage in terms of the
subsidy as well as the loss in utility from substitution effects of the policy.
Hence, here I have some low-quality used car buyers that keep the low-quality
car as the subsidy might not be high enough, while some others scrap it.








n, where types in [0, θ
∗





purchase a low-quality used car, and scrap it, types in [θ∗lk, θ
∗
h] buy low-quality
used cars and keep it, types in [θ∗h, θ
∗
n] purchase high-quality used cars, and
finally types in [θ∗n, θ] purchase new cars every period and resell the used cars
in the second hand market.










h ). The exogenous
variable is S, whose optimal rate I want to solve for from the welfare equation.
The indifference equations for each marginal type are:
θ∗n − Pn + δ[pP ∗h + (1− p)P ∗l ] = θ∗nwh − P ∗h (3.16)
θ∗hwh − P ∗h = θ∗hwl − P ∗l (3.17)
S = θ∗lkwl (3.18)
P ∗l = S (3.19)
p(1− θ∗n) = θ∗n − θ∗h (3.20)
(1− p)(1− θ∗n) = θ∗h − θ∗ls (3.21)
The subsidy rate is equal to the low-quality used car price. Thus, when selling
a low-quality used car, the seller is indifferent between re-selling in the used
car market and scrapping. I assume that the seller re-sells in the case of indif-
ference between these two decisions. The above system of equations is solved
and each endogenous variable is expressed in terms of the subsidy rate, S. I
substitute each of these reduced form solutions for the endogenous variables
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θ − Pn + δ(pP ∗h + (1− p)P ∗l )
1− δ dθ +
∫ θ∗n(S)
θ∗h(S)





θwl − P ∗l
1− δ dθ +
∫ θ∗lk(S)
θ∗ls(S)











Differentiating the above welfare equation with respect to S and setting
it equal to zero solves for the optimal subsidy, S∗o in the observable case. This
subsidy is calculated for a given set of parameters in the Numerical Section
below.
3.3 Equilibrium when quality is not observable
3.3.1 No Scrappage Subsidy
In this section I examine the case where used car quality is observed
only by the seller and not by the buyer. I use the results here to contrast
the allocation and prices of used cars obtained to that under the observable
case without a subsidy in Section 3.2.1. Due to this information asymmetry
used car buyers have lower expectation regarding the average quality of the
traded used car. A high-quality used car is now priced according to this
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average expectation. Since all used cars in this case are sold at one price,
the price of the good quality cars is now lower than it was in the observable
case without the subsidy, while that of the bad quality ones is higher. This
in turn distorts the behavior of some of the sellers. Some of the consumers
who were previously purchasing a new car and reselling the used car after one
period do not continue to do so. Instead, now they keep their used car if it
turns out to be of high quality, and sells it only if the it turns out to be of
low quality. For these types, the benefit of purchasing a new car is less than
the utility lost from receiving a lower price for their high-quality used car at
the time of resale. Thus, these types now enter the new car market less often.
Information asymmetry drives out some, but not all of the good cars from the
resale market and hence raises the fraction of used cars that are of low-quality.
Thus, the quantity of emissions generated in the presence of adverse selection,
QiE is greater than that generated in its absence, Q
o
E.
The highest valuation consumers continue to purchase a new car and
sell it when it turns used at the end of one period, even if the car turns out to
be of high quality. This is because their utility gain from enjoying the higher
services of a new car is greater than the loss in value from selling their used
car at a lower price in the used car market.4 In equilibrium, types in [θ, θiu] do
not purchase a car, types in [θiu, θ
i
nk] purchase a used car every period, types
in [θink, θ
i
n] purchase a new car, keep the used car if it is of good quality and
4This is different from the Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) result, and in my paper it is due to
my definition of new and used cars.
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trades if it turns out to be of low-quality, and finally types in [θin, θ] purchase
a new car and trade in the used car at the end of the first period regardless
of quality. The behavior of these four types of consumers are characterized as
follows:
(1) Types in [θin, θ]: The lifetime utility of these highest valuation consumers
is:
V in =
θ − Pn + δP iu − µQiE
1− δ (3.23)
where P iu is the price of a used car, and Q
i
E is the quantity of emissions
produced under information asymmetry.
(2) Types in [θink, θ
i
n]: The behavior of these consumers is the distortion
created by adverse selection. These consumers would have ideally liked
to purchase new cars at the end of every period, but their valuations
are not high enough to compensate them for the loss in value of their
good-quality used cars. Their lifetime utility is:
V ink = θ − Pn − µQiE + δ(1− p)[P iu + V ink] + δp[θwh + δV ink]
⇒ V ink =
θ(1 + δpwh)− µQiE + δ(1− p)P iu − P in
1− δ(1− p)− δ2p (3.24)
(3) Types in [θiu, θ
i
nk]: At the time of purchase, these types no longer know
what quality car they will be driving. Thus, they form expectations
about the quality of the traded used car, denoted by wiu, and in equilib-
rium this is equal to the average quality of the used cars being supplied.
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The lifetime utility of these consumers is given as follows:
V iu =
θwiu − P iu − µQiE
1− δ (3.25)
Here I assume that agents can trade only once in the used car market.
This implies that owners of low-quality used cars cannot resell in the
second-hand market, once they learn the quality of their purchase.
(4) Types in [θ, θiu]: Their lifetime utility is:
V i0 = −
µQiE
1− δ (3.26)







n is indifferent between purchasing a new car at the
end of a period and keeping the used car if it turns out to be of good quality.
Type θink is indifferent between purchasing a new car and keeping the good
quality used car, or buying a used car every period. Finally, type θiu is indif-







θin − Pn + δP iu
1− δ =
θin(1 + δpwh) + δ(1− p)Pu − Pn








θink(1 + δpwh) + δ(1− p)P iu − Pn
1− δ(1− p)− δ2p =
θinkw
i








u) ⇒ θiuwiu = P iu
(3.27)
The price of used cars in this framework is determined by the market
clearing condition for used cars where the demand for used cars equals their
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supply. This is given as follows:
F (θnk)− F (θu) = F (θ)− F (θn) + (1− p)[F (θn)− F (θnk)] (3.28)
Note that in the presence of adverse selection, only one market exists for both
the good and bad qualities of used cars. Finally, the last equilibrium condition
defines expectations of the used car buyer as:
wiu =
(1− p)[F (θin)− F (θink)]wl + [F (θ)− F (θin)](pwh + (1− p)wl)
F (θ)− F (θin) + (1− p)[F (θin)− F (θink)]
(3.29)
This ratio expresses the average quality of the used car being traded as a
proportion of the total fraction of used cars in the market. In the numerical
section, I use equations 3.27, 3.28 and 3.29 to determine the effects of adverse
selection on the allocations of low-quality used cars, and hence on emissions,
and then compare the results to the observable case without the subsidy.
3.3.2 With a Subsidy to Scrap all Low-quality Used cars
When the government offers a subsidy to induce individuals to scrap
their cars, I can have one of the two following cases: either a subsidy that
maintains an active resale market, or one that does not. In Section 3.4, I
characterize the parameter space that determines which of these two cases
exists. I also discuss the effects on welfare in each case, and indicate which is
a better equilibrium to achieve. I now discuss the behavior of consumers when
the subsidy is such that no resale market exists.
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3.3.3 Case 1: Subsidy with no Resale Market
In this section the subsidy is such that the used car sellers prefer to scrap
their cars rather than resell them in the market. Two types of consumers exist
in this case. The highest valuation consumers continue to purchase a new
car every period and to scrap the used car regardless of its quality. Lower
valuation consumers enter the new car market less often, keep their used car
if it is of good quality, and scrap it if it turns out to be of poor quality. In





new cars, keep it if it is of good quality and scrap it if it is of poor quality,
and types in [θisn , θ] purchase a new car and scrap it when it turns used in the
next period. The behavior of each of these types is characterized below:
(a) Types in [θisn , θ]: These consumers scrap a used car, regardless of whether
it is of high- or low-quality. Thus, a subsidy in this case pays for the
scrappage of some good used cars along with the polluting ones. The
lifetime utility of a typical consumer of this type is:
V isn =
θ − Pn + δSis
1− δ (3.30)
where Sis is the scrappage subsidy with information asymmetry and no
resale market. Since all poor-quality cars are scrapped, the quantity of
emissions is zero.
(b) Types in [θisnk, θ
is
n ]: Their lifetime utility is given as follows:
V isnk =
θ − Pn + δ(1− p)Sis + δpθwh
1− δ(1− p)− δ2p (3.31)
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If the subsidy is high enough, these types will also scrap their high-
quality used cars, and hence only the consumers in (a) will exist. Then
I will only have the new car buyer and the no car buyer. Used cars of
all types will have been scrapped. To prevent this from occurring, the
subsidy must be such that this consumer is better off keeping the good
quality cars, rather than scrapping them (more on this below).
(c) Types in [θ, θisnk]: Their lifetime utility is zero in every period.
Marginal consumers, θisn , and θ
is
nk are defined by their respective indifference
conditions, given below:
θisn − Pn + δS
1− δ =
θisn − Pn + δ(1− p)S + δpwh
1− δ(1− p)− δ2p
θisnk − Pn + δ(1− p)S + δpwh = 0 (3.32)
where θisn is indifferent between the purchase of a new car every period and
the purchase of one less often, and θisnk is indifferent between the purchase of
a new car and keeping it if it turns out to be a high-quality used car, and not
choosing a car. The subsidy that supports the above allocation is such that the
marginal consumer, θisnk, must never want to keep a low-quality used car. This
means Sis ≥ θisnkwl. The minimum level of this subsidy is: Sis = θisnkwl. This
equation along with the two marginal conditions determine the equilibrium.
I use these equations to contrast the subsidy level required to maintain this
equilibrium relative to that in the observable case, and also indicate how this
subsidy affects the welfare of the different types of consumers.
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3.3.4 Case 2: Subsidy with an Active Resale Market
In this case the subsidy is such that the behavior of the used car suppli-
ers is similar to the case without the subsidy. The used car buyers, however,
behave differently. All used car buyers form expectations regarding the prob-
ability that a traded used car will be of high-quality. In equilibrium this is
equal to the proportion of high quality cars traded in the second-hand market.
If the used car that these consumers purchase turns out to be of high-quality,
they keep it, but if it turns out to be of low-quality, they scrap it. Thus, all
low-quality used cars are scrapped and QisrE = 0.





purchase a used car, keep it if it turns out to be of high-quality, but scrap it
if it is of low-quality, types in [θisrnk , θ
isr
n ] purchase a new car, keep the used car
if it is of good quality, but sell it if it is of poor quality, and finally types in
[θisrn , θ] purchase a new car and resell the used car, regardless of quality. The
behavior of these four types of consumer is described as follows:
(a) Types in [θisrn , θ]: Their lifetime utility is given as follows:
V isrn =
θ − Pn + δP isru
1− δ (3.33)
where P isru is the used car price.
(b) Types in [θisrnk , θ
isr
n ]: Their lifetime utility is:
V isrnk = θ − Pn + δ(1− p)[P isru + V isrnk ] + δp[θwh + δV isrnk ]
⇒ V isrnk =
θ(1 + δpwh) + δ(1− p)P isru − Pn
1− δ(1− p)− δ2p (3.34)
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(c) Types in [θisru , θ
isr
nk ]: If the quality of the used car they purchase is of high
quality, then they continue to drive it. On the other hand, if it turns
out to be of low quality, then they scrap it. Let wisru be the consumer’s
belief that his or her purchased used car is of high quality. If the quality
of the car that the used car buyer purchases is lower than expected, then
he or she scraps it. Their lifetime utility is below:
V isru =
(1− wisru )Sisr + wisru θwh − P isru
1− δ (3.35)
In equilibrium wisru is equal to the proportion of high-quality used cars being
traded in the market. The no car buyers get a lifetime utility equal to zero.
On the boundary between consumers who purchase a new car every period
and those who keep their used car of good quality is a marginal consumer
with preference θisrn , which is defined by his or her indifference between the
two decisions. Let the marginal consumer between those who keep their high
quality used cars and purchase used cars be denoted by θisrnk . Lastly, let the
marginal consumer indifferent between purchasing a used car and the no car
option be denoted by θisru . The three indifference equations are given below:
θisrn − Pn + δP isru
1− δ =
θisrn (1 + δpwh) + δ(1− p)P isru − Pn
1− δ(1− p)− δ2p
θisrnk (1 + δpwh) + δ(1− p)P isru − Pn
1− δ(1− p)− δ2p =
(1− wisru )Sisr + wisru θisrnk wh − P isru
1− δ
(1− wisru )Sisr + wisru θisru wh − P isru
1− δ = 0 (3.36)
The price of used cars is determined by the market clearing condition where
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the supply of used cars equals the demand for it.
F (θ)− F (θisrn ) + (1− p)[F (θisrnk )− F (θisru )] = F (θisrnk )− F (θisru ) (3.37)
I assume that the expectations of used car buyers is correct and is:
wsru =
p(F (θ)− F (θsrn ))
F (θ)− F (θsrn ) + (1− p)[F (θsrn )− F (θsrnk)]
(3.38)
In the presence of information asymmetry even the highest type amongst the
used car buyers can purchase a car that turns out to be of low quality. To
prevent them from keeping it, the subsidy must be such that Sisr ≥ θisrnk wl,
out of which the minimum level is selected. The equilibrium solution is ob-
tained from the equations 3.36, 3.37, 3.38 and the equation for the minimum
subsidy level. I use the system of equations here to compute the equilibrium
allocations, compare the subsidy level obtained here to that in the observable
case, and finally discuss the welfare effects of such a subsidy. I also compare
the welfare results obtained here to that obtained with a subsidy that shuts
down the used car market to indicate which is a more preferred outcome.
3.3.5 Optimal subsidy rate with unobservable quality







n, where types in [0, θ
∗





purchase a used car, keeps it if it is of good quality, but scraps it if it is of bad
quality, types in [θ∗uk, θ
∗
nk] buy used car, keep it regardless of quality, types in
[θ∗nk, θ
∗
n] purchase new cars, keep the used car if of good quality and resell if
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of poor quality, and finally types in [θ∗n, θ] purchase new cars every period and
resell the used cars in the second hand market.










u ), where w
∗
u is
the expectation of the used car buyer of the average quality of the traded used
car, and P ∗u is the used car price. The exogenous variable is S, whose optimal
rate I want to solve for from the welfare equation.
Equations to solve for the endogenous variables in terms of S:
θ∗n − Pn + δP ∗u =
θ∗n(1 + δpwh) + δ(1− p)P ∗u − Pn
1 + δp
−P ∗u + θ∗nk(wu(wh − wl) + wl) =
θ∗nk(1 + δpwh) + δ(1− p)P ∗u − Pn
1 + δp
θ∗ukwl = S
−P ∗u + (1− wu)S + w∗uθ∗uwh = 0
1− θ∗n + (θ∗n − θ∗nk)(1− p/2) = θ∗nk − θ∗u
w∗u =
p(1− θ∗n)
1− θ∗n + (θ∗n − θ∗nk)(1− p/2)
(3.39)
The reduced form solution is given in Appendix F. As in the case of
observable car quality, I substitute the reduced form solutions from above for

























where Vn(θ) is the value function for new car buyers, Vnk(θ) is the value func-
tion for new car buyers who keep the good quality cars, Vuk(θ) is the value
function for the types who are used car buyers that keep it regardless of qual-
ity, Vu(θ) is the value function of the used car buyer who are used car buyers,
keep wh cars and scrap wl cars, and finally V0(θ) is the value function for the
no car owner. All endogenous variables are functions of the subsidy rate. To
solve for the optimal subsidy rate, I differentiate the above function and set it
equal to zero. An example is computed in section 3.4.
3.4 Numerical Section
In this section I numerically analyze each of the equilibria characterized
above under the assumption that θ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
In particular, I focus on how the effective scrappage subsidy affects the deci-
sions of individuals in the primary and secondary markets with and without
information asymmetry. I further analyze how the policy affects the welfare
of each type of consumer when quality is observable and compare the results
to when quality is unobservable. The results below are presented for constant
values of the following exogenous parameters: δ = 0.8, wh = 0.5, Pn = 0.7,
p = 0.6, α = 0.2, β = 0.8 and µ = 0.4. Finally, I change these values to test
the robustness of my results.
When quality is observable, the second-hand market perfectly matches
cars to the “right” owners through the self-selection mechanism. This means
that consumers choose used and new cars based on their respective valuations.
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The consumers most sensitive to quality purchase new cars, while those that
are least sensitive to quality choose low-quality used cars. In this case, the
government can subsidize scrappage of the low-quality used cars by adequately
compensating the highest type that owns such a car. In the presence of such a
subsidy, only high-quality used cars are traded in the secondary market, while
the low-quality ones are scrapped. However, this policy does not get rid of all
the high-emissions cars as in my example 20 percent of high-quality cars turn
out to be highly polluting.
Table 3.1 illustrates how effective the subsidy will be in reducing pol-
lution when car quality is observable, but emissions are not.5 Under these
conditions the government has some information on the allocations of used
cars of different quality. It uses this information to attract some of the pollut-
ing cars by conditioning the subsidy on car quality. The subsidy is set such
that all low-quality used cars are scrapped. This still leaves the polluting high-
quality vehicles on the road. The subsidy acts as a price floor in the low-quality
used car market, thereby raising the resale price of a new car if it turns out
to be of low-quality. Some prior owners of low-quality used cars now switch
to buying high-quality used cars. Thus, in the presence of the subsidy the
marginal high-quality used car buyer falls from 0.494 to 0.473 (columns 2 and
3). The greater demand for high-quality used cars raises its price from 0.234
5Emissions is never observable to the government. The paper examines whether the
government can still run an effective scrappage program aimed at reducing pollution in the
absence of information. It can be effective in reducing pollution significantly if emissions
and quality are very negatively correlated.
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to 0.236. A new car now becomes more attractive as its salvage value rises due
to both the scrappage subsidy and the higher price for high-quality used cars.
Thus, more consumers participate in the primary market as the marginal new
car buyer falls from 0.683 to 0.670. Moreover, the effective subsidy in this case
is at its minimum level at 0.047.
The optimal subsidy is calculated at the point where marginal envi-
ronmental benefits from scrappage equal the marginal costs in terms of utility
lost from substituting to cars of higher quality or to the no-car option. When
quality is observable, the optimal subsidy rate is S∗o = 0.023 = P
∗
l . This is
below the subsidy rate that the government sets to induce all low-quality used
cars to scrap. I examine below how this optimal value of the subsidy changes
with changes in µ, α and β.
When quality and emissions are unobservable, on the other hand, the
seller of a car has more information about its quality than the prospective
buyer, and this adversely affects the average quality of cars traded in the
second-hand market. In the presence of such information asymmetry, a higher
valuation consumer relative to the case when only car quality is observable
can get a low-quality used car. The government wants to scrap the most pol-
luting cars. Since it cannot observe emissions it offers a subsidy to adequately
compensate the highest type amongst used car buyers in this case and gets
a mix of low-quality and high-quality cars. I compare the subsidy levels and
the level of aggregate emissions that result in the two equilibria possible with
129
information asymmetry to that in the observable case.6 More on each of these
equilibria below.
Table 3.2 illustrates the effects of the subsidy that maintains an active
resale market in the presence of information asymmetry. The government
achieves effective scrappage with a subsidy less than the used car price (column
3). All used car sellers re-sell their low-quality cars in the secondary market.
The used car price (P isru = 0.118) lies below the value that the lowest type
amongst the used car buyers gets from a high-quality car (θisru wh = 0.165),
but it lies above the value that the highest type amongst the used car buyers
gets from a low-quality used car (θisrnk wl = 0.053). Thus, a typical used car
buyer would like to only buy and keep a high-quality used car. However, with
information asymmetry these types cannot separate a good quality car from
a bad one. With a subsidy in such a market, types in [θisru , θ
isr
nk ] keep the
high-quality car since their benefit from it is greater than the used car price,
and hence the subsidy. However, they scrap the low-quality used car as their
benefit from it is below the used car price and hence the subsidy.
Table 3.2 also shows what replacement options the prior low-quality
used car buyers choose in the presence of the subsidy. Some consumers who
previously chose the no-car option, now switch to purchasing a used car that
they scrap if it is of low quality, and keep if it is of high quality. In Table 3.2
this is seen from the fact that the lowest type to purchase a used car falls from
6The two equilibria described here are not multiple equilibria as one of them ceases to
exist for some parameter values.
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0.376 to 0.331. This higher demand raises the used car price from 0.116 to
0.118. This in turn causes some new car buyers who were previously keeping
the high-quality used car to re-sell it and participate in the primary market at
the end of every period. Thus, the marginal buyer to purchase a new car every
period falls from 0.983 to 0.976. This greater participation in the secondary
market by the higher type of car owners raises the average quality of the traded
car from 0.055 to 0.341, thereby inducing some prior used car buyers to switch
to a new car and to keep the high-quality realizations. The marginal consumer
of this type falls from 0.562 to 0.533.
Comparing results in the observable case to that in the unobservable
case without the subsidy (column 2 in Tables 3.1 and 3.2), I find that the
quantity of emissions generated is greater with information asymmetry. This
is an expected result but important to interpret from an environmental per-
spective. When quality is unobservable, used car buyers expect the average
quality of the traded car to be less than the average quality of all used cars.
Hence, the high-quality used car is priced according to the used car buyers’
expectations, thereby reducing its price and causing a positive measure of new
car buyers to keep their high-quality used cars. This implies that low-quality
used cars constitute a greater proportion of trade in the second-hand
I also examine how information asymmetry affects the minimum level
of the effective subsidy required to achieve the goal of attracting the poorest
quality of cars in the hope of reducing the proportion of the most polluting
cars on the road. The subsidy required to scrap all the low-quality cars when
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quality and emissions are unobservable is higher (Sisr = 0.053) than that
under the case when quality is observable, but emissions is not (Sos = 0.047).
This is because when quality is observable, but emissions is not, the subsidy
must ensure that the highest type amongst the consumers who choose the
no-car option, θosh , must prefer this decision to purchasing a low-quality used
car. However, under the unobservable case the subsidy must ensure that the
highest type amongst the used car buyers, θisrnk , prefers to scrap a low-quality
car than to use it. As seen from column 3 in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the highest
type who does not purchase a car under the observable case (θosh = 0.473) is
lower than the highest type who purchases a used car in the unobservable case
(θisrnk = 0.533). Thus, the subsidy required for effective scrappage is higher in
the latter case than in the former.
The equilibrium with a subsidy that maintains an active resale market
exists only for some parameter spaces. In Section 3.4.2 below I further char-
acterize this parameter space. When this equilibrium does not exist, then the
government can implement the subsidy at a level that shuts down the resale
market. In Tables 3.3 and 3.4 I compute the equilibria for the observable and
unobservable cases respectively, for values of the parameters under which a
resale market cannot exist with the scrappage subsidy. Results in Table 3.3
follow the same intuition as those in Table 3.1. But I present it again in order
to compare the results to the unobservable case without the secondary mar-
ket. In the presence of a subsidy that closes the resale market, the owners
who choose a new car at the end of a period prefer to scrap their used car
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regardless of quality, rather than re-sell it. Thus, the government subsidizes
scrappage of the high-quality cars along with the low-quality cars.
Comparing columns 2 and 3 in Table 3.4, I see that some prior used
car buyers switch to purchasing a new car and keeping the high-quality used
car. The marginal consumer who keeps wh falls from 0.588 to 0.530. This
switch is greater in this case than that under the unobservable case with the
active resale market as the new car is the relevant substitute for prior used car
buyers. The subsidy raises the salvage value of the new car and makes it more
attractive to purchase a new car now than before, thereby raising its demand.
The marginal consumer purchasing a new car every period falls from 0.991 to
0.923. Moreover, the effective subsidy in this case (Sis = 0.133)is higher than
the one in Table 3.2 (Sisr = 0.053).
When quality is unobservable, the optimal subsidy rate is S∗o = 0.053,
which is also below the level set for scrappage of all low-quality used cars, but
above its level when quality is observable. I examine the sensitivity of this
result with respect to changes in µ, α, and β.
3.4.1 Welfare Implications
Here I provide some intuition regarding how the scrappage program
affects the welfare of each type of consumer in the observable and unobservable
cases. I first look at how each type of consumer fares in the presence of a
subsidy relative to without it when car quality is observable (Table 3.1). As
seen in Section 3.2.2, three types of consumers exist here: those who choose
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not to buy a car, those who purchase a high-quality used car, and those who
purchase a new car at the end of every period.
(1) Types in [θ, θosh ]: These are the consumers who choose the no-car option
in the presence of the subsidy. Some amongst these types who were
choosing this option even in the absence of a subsidy become better off
under the subsidy due to the environmental gain. However, some prior
low-quality used car buyers now switch to not purchasing a car. They
lose the benefit of driving a car, but can become better off than before
if the environmental gain outweighs their loss. Thus, the net effect on
this type is ambiguous.
(2) Types in [θosh , θ
os
n ]: These are the buyers of high-quality used cars. The
welfare effects on these buyers are similar to that of the no-car buyers.
Those who choose the high-quality car with and without a subsidy are
better off, but those who switch from a low-quality to a high-quality
used car experience a lower surplus from driving. In this equilibrium the
latter types are better off driving a high-quality used car to not driving
one at all. However, if a high-quality used car is their first best choice,
then they would have been choosing it irrespective of the subsidy. These
types might still become become better off if the gain from improved air
quality outweighs the loss in surplus.
(3) Types in [θosn , θ]: These buyers purchase a new car at the end of every
period and the policy makes all types in this category unambiguously
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better off. The subsidy makes those who were always choosing this
option better off due to a higher resale price for every quality realization
of their used car. This higher benefit from driving reinforces the gain
from improved air quality. Those who switch to this option under the
subsidy from a high-quality used car also benefit from the scrappage
policy. This is because the benefit from driving a good-quality used car
for these latter types is reduced due to the higher price. Moreover, a
new car is more attractive under the subsidy because it fetches a higher
price when it turns into a good-quality used car as well as when it turns
out to be a poor-quality used car.
Thus, while the highest valuation consumers are the winners of the scrappage
program, the used car buyers and those who choose the no-car option could
worse off. Consequently when quality is observable, aggregate welfare with
a subsidy when quality is observable might be lower than that without the
subsidy.
Next, I examine the welfare effects of the subsidy that maintains a
resale market in the unobservable case to that of the case without a subsidy
(Table 3.2). In this case, I have four types of consumers: those who always
purchase a new car at the end of the first period, those who purchase a new
car, and keep the high-quality used car, used car buyers, and those who do
not purchase a car.
(1) Types in [θisrn , θ]: These consumers purchase a new car at the end of a
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period. Prior new car buyers that continue with the same decision in the
presence of the subsidy become better off as they get a higher price for
every type of used car, while the new car price is held constant. Those
who switch to purchasing a new car at the end of every period from
purchasing a new car, but keeping their high-quality used car, are also
better off. The reason why these types were choosing not to purchase a
new car at the end of every period is because the resale price for the good
quality used car was too low. But the used car price rises in the presence
of the subsidy. Thus, the types who switch over get a higher surplus from
driving a new car and this gain in surplus reinforces their environmental
benefit. Thus, all new car buyers are made unambiguously better off by
the subsidy.
(2) Types in [θisrnk , θ
isr
n ]: These consumers choose a new car, keep the high-
quality used car, and resell the low-quality car. All consumers who
choose this option with and without the subsidy are better off because
they get a greater compensation for their low-quality used car due to the
scrappage subsidy than they were getting from the used car price before.
Moreover, prior used car buyers now switch to being a type in [θisrnk , θ
isr
n ]
because the new car is more attractive due to the higher price of the
used car. Their valuations from driving a car are not high enough for
them to drive a new car every period. Hence those who were previously
purchasing a used car now replace it with a new car in the first period
and with a high-quality used car in the second. Thus all types in this
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category are unambiguously better off by the subsidy.
(3) Types in [θisru , θ
isr
nk ]: These are the used car buyers. The prior used car
buyers who continue to choose this option are worse off due to the higher
price they now have to pay for their used car. However, the subsidy more
than compensates them for the rise in the price of the used car (See Table
3.2). Moreover, some consumers switch over from the no-car option to
the used car option since it makes them better off, otherwise they would
have continued to not purchase a car.
(4) Types in [θ, θisru ]: These are the no-car buyers. All of these buyers are
made better off by the subsidy due to the environmental gain.
Thus, the subsidy that maintains a resale market unambiguously makes all
types of consumers better off than they were without it when quality is unob-
servable. The subsidy can increase aggregate welfare if the cost of the subsidy
does not outweigh the higher benefit to all consumers.
Lastly, I compare how the subsidy affects the welfare of consumers when
it can only be implemented without a resale market (Table 3.4). Here I have
three types of consumers: new car buyers, those who purchase a new car, keep
it after a period if it is of high-quality, and scrap it after the first period if it
turns out to be of low-quality.
(1) Types in [θisn , θ]: These are the new car buyers. Those new car buyers
who were choosing this option with and without a subsidy are unam-
biguously better off as the subsidy is giving them a better resale price
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for their used car. Those who switch to this option are also made unam-
biguously better off because this is the first best choice for these types.
The only reason they were not choosing to do so is because the used car
price was too low for them to re-sell the high-quality used car. The sub-
sidy now offers them a greater return for their used car and causes some
of them to switch to purchasing a new car at the end of every period.
(2) Types in [θisnk, θ
is
n ]: These consumers purchase a new car, keep the used
car if it is of high quality and scrap it if it is of low quality. Those
amongst this type that continue with the same decision before and after
the subsidy are unambiguously better off. This is because while con-
suming the same quality car, they now receive a higher price for the
low-quality used car, and also derive environmental benefits due to the
policy. However, the welfare effect of the subsidy on those amongst this
type who switch over from purchasing a used car is ambiguous. Now
even though these types enjoy the higher services from a new car in the
first period and a high-quality used car in the second, their valuation for
quality might not be high enough to adequately compensate them for the
higher new car price. So choosing this option for these types might be
better than not purchasing a car, but it might make them worse off than
they were in the absence of the subsidy. Thus, those who switch over to
being in this category enjoy a lower surplus from driving. However, they
could still be better off with the subsidy if the benefits from higher air
quality compensate them for this reduced surplus.
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(c) Types in [θ, θisnk]: These are the no car buyers. Amongst the no-car
buyers, those who choose this with and without the subsidy are made
better off due to the benefit from cleaner air. However, some prior used
car buyers now switch to the no-car option as the next best option of
purchasing a new car is too expensive in relation to their valuation for
quality. Hence, they might be made worse off if the environmental gain
does not outweigh their utility loss from driving a car.
The discussion above suggests that the subsidy that maintains the re-
sale market makes all types of consumers unambiguously better off than they
were in the absence of it, when quality is unobservable. Moreover, it achieves
scrappage at a lower rate than the subsidy that shuts down the secondary mar-
ket. Hence if the cost of the subsidy to society does not outweigh the utility
gain to all types of consumers, then it is a Pareto-improvement to subsidize
scrappage of low-quality cars (most of which are polluting) while maintaining
the resale market.
3.4.2 Sensitivity Results
In Table 3.5, I characterize the parameter space within which an equi-
librium with a resale market exists along with its sensitivity to changes in
the parameter values. I use the following parameters as the benchmark for
comparison: δ = 0.8, wh = 0.5, Pn = 0.7, p = 0.6, wl = 0.1, α = 0.8, β = 0.2,
and µ = 0.4. First, I change the value of the probability of a used car being
of high-quality (p). The equilibrium with an active resale market exists for
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all values of p higher than the benchmark value, but it ceases to exist if p
falls below 0.436, given values of all other parameters. Then the equilibrium
switches to the one without a resale market. If p rises above 0.6, the subsidy
under the resale market rises, while if it falls below 0.6 and above 0.436, then
the subsidy falls. When p rises, the average quality of the traded car rises due
to higher expectations. This raises the used car price, causing more consumers
who previously kept wh to resell their cars. Thus, tnk rises and hence a greater
compensation is required to induce scrappage. The opposite occurs when p
falls below 0.6. Under the equilibrium without resale, the sensitivity of the
subsidy moves in the opposite direction. As p falls, the subsidy levels rise.
This is because the new car is less likely to be a high-quality car, and thereby
reduces its attractiveness. Hence, the marginal consumer who purchases a new
car and keeps wh used car rises relative to the benchmark case, and hence the
subsidy rises.
Next I change the value of wh. The equilibrium with resale exists for
all lower values of wh, but ceases to exist if it rises above 0.73. The subsidy
under resale falls with higher values of wh, but rises when wh falls. When wh
rises, the new car becomes more attractive, and tn falls. Also, more consumers
are willing to keep the wh used cars, causing tnk and hence the subsidy to fall.
The subsidy in the absence of a resale also falls when wh rises. The opposite
occurs when wh falls, causing the subsidy to rise. Next, I test the sensitivity
of the equilibria for different values of wl. The equilibrium with resale exists
for values of wl below 0.1, and the subsidy falls with lower values of wl. If this
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parameter is above 0.25, then we get the equilibrium without a resale market.
The subsidy level here rises with higher values of wl. When wl rises, the logic
is the same as when wh falls, and vice-versa.
Finally, I observe how the optimal subsidy rate changes when quality is
observable and unobservable. The results are presented in Table 3.5. When the
probability that a low-quality car is polluting relative to a high-quality used
car is held constant, along with other parameters and µ is increased (reduced),
the optimal subsidy rises (falls) in both cases as the damages from pollution
rises (falls). A similar effect is observed when α is raised (reduced) holding
all else constant. Both of these parameters affect the damages from pollution
generated by the used cars, causing the subsidy to be changed accordingly.
3.5 Conclusion
I have shown that information asymmetry has non-trivial effects on
the scrappage subsidy and the welfare implications of the resulting replace-
ment choices. One key result is that in the presence of adverse selection in
the second-hand automobile market, a subsidy that maintains a resale market
unambiguously makes all types of consumers better off. However, if this op-
tion of implementing the subsidy does not exist, then it might be better not
to do anything rather than have a scrappage program that shuts down the
second-hand market. Moreover, the subsidy with a resale market achieves the
government’s goal at a lower cost relative to the subsidy that shuts down the
resale market. Finally, the optimal subsidy for scrappage is lower than the
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subsidy currently used to scrap all low-quality used cars. A relevant extension
to this work would be to to compare the welfare effects of the scrappage sub-
sidy to other forms of environmental policy, such as taxes on new and used
vehicles.
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Table 3.1: Allocation of cars, Subsidy rate and Emissions when Car Quality
is observable, and with a low-quality used car significantly inferior to a high-
quality used car (wl = 0.1)
Variables (1) No Subsidy (2) With Subsidy (3)
θol (1) 0.367 -
θoh (2) 0.494 0.473
θon (3) 0.683 0.670
Ph (4) 0.234 0.236
Pl (5) 0.037 -
Subsidy (6) 0 0.047
Traded wh cars 0.6 0.6
Emissions (7) 0.063 0.0394
The variables names in Column 1 are as follows: θol stands for marginal low-quality
used car buyer, θoh stands for marginal high-quality used car buyer, theta
o
n is the marginal
new car buyer, Ph is the price of high-quality used cars, and Pl is the price of low-quality
used cars. Exact values of other parameters are: δ = 0.8, wh = 0.5, Pn = 0.7, p = 0.6,
α = 0.2, β = 0.8 and µ = 0.4. The emissions function is: QE = βql + αqh, where qh is
quantity of high-quality used cars, and ql is the quantity of low-quality used cars. All
numbers in the table are expressed as fractions of the total population of individuals.
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Table 3.2: Allocation of cars, Subsidy rate and Emissions when Car Quality
is Unobservable, and with a low-quality used car significantly inferior to a
high-quality used car (wl = 0.1) in the Presence of a Resale Market
Variables (1) No Subsidy (2) Subsidy (3)
Marginal used car buyer (1) 0.376 0.331
Marginal new car buyer, keeps wh (2) 0.562 0.533
Marginal new car buyer (3) 0.983 0.976
wu (4) 0.254 –
Traded wh cars (5) 0.055 0.341
Pu (6) 0.116 0.118
Subsidy (7) 0 0.053
Emissions (8) 0.132 0.077
The variables names in Column 1 are as follows: wu is the expectation of a
high-quality used car, and Pu is the price of used cars. Exact values of other parameters
are: δ = 0.8, wh = 0.5, Pn = 0.7, p = 0.6, α = 0.2, β = 0.8 and µ = 0.4. The emissions
function is: QE = βql + αqh, where qh is quantity of high-quality used cars, and ql is the
quantity of low-quality used cars. All numbers in the table are expressed as fractions of
the total population of individuals.
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Table 3.3: Allocation of cars, Subsidy rate and Emissions when Car Quality is
Observable, and with a low-quality used car not so inferior to a high-quality
used car (wl = 0.25)
Variables (1) No Subsidy (2) Subsidy (3)
Marginal low-quality buyer (1) 0.378 -
Marginal high-quality buyer (2) 0.502 0.453
Marginal new car buyer (3) 0.689 0.658
Ph (4) 0.220 0.226
Pl (5) 0.094 -
Subsidy (6) 0 0.113
Emissions (7) 0.2086 0.041
The variables names in Column 1 are as follows: Ph is the price of high-quality used
cars, and Pl is the price of low-quality used cars. Exact values of other parameters are:
δ = 0.8, wh = 0.5, Pn = 0.7, p = 0.6, α = 0.2, β = 0.8 and µ = 0.4. The emissions function
is: QE = βql + αqh, where qh is quantity of high-quality used cars, and ql is the quantity
of low-quality used cars. All numbers in the table are expressed as fractions of the total
population of individuals.
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Table 3.4: Allocation of cars, Subsidy rate and Emissions when Car Quality
is Unobservable, with a low-quality used car not so inferior to a high-quality
used car (wl = 0.25) and without Resale Market
Variables (1) No Subsidy (2) Subsidy (3)
Marginal used car buyer (1) 0.417 –
Marginal new car buyer, keeps wh (2) 0.588 0.530
Marginal new car buyer every period (3) 0.991 0.923
wu (4) 0.270 –
Proportion of Traded wh cars (5) 0.032 –
Pu (6) 0.114 –
Subsidy (7) 0 0.133
Emissions (8) 0.062 0.047
The variables names in Column 1 are as follows: wu is the expectation of a
high-quality used car, and Pu is the price of used cars. Exact values of other parameters
are: δ = 0.8, wh = 0.5, Pn = 0.7, p = 0.6, α = 0.2, β = 0.8 and µ = 0.4. The emissions
function is: QE = βql + αqh, where qh is quantity of high-quality used cars, and ql is the
quantity of low-quality used cars. All numbers in the table are expressed as fractions of
the total population of individuals.
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Table 3.5: Sensitivity Results to illustrate changes in the Subsidy Rate when
Car Quality is Unobservable, Base Parameter Values: wl = 0.1, wh = 0.5,
Pn = 0.7, δ = 0.8, p = 0.6
Param. Resale No Resale
θu θnk tn qh Pu S θnk tn S
p 0.6 0.33 0.53 0.976 0.34 0.118 .053 - - -
p 0.7 0.36 0.56 0.906 0.536 0.137 .056 - - -
p 0.5 0.34 0.54 1.065 0.203 0.093 .054 - - -
p 0.4 - - - - - .579 1.191 .057
wh 0.4 0.37 0.55 0.996 0.021 0.057 .055 - - -
wh 0.6 0.30 0.52 0.942 0.18 0.595 .052 - - -
wh 0.8 - - - - - .616 2.945 .062
wh 0.9 - - - - - .478 6.139 .048
wl 0.3 - - - - - .557 0.798 .167
wl .05 0.34 0.54 0.977 0.431 0.117 .027 - - -
Pn 0.8 0.44 0.63 0.921 0.621 0.188 .063 - - -
Pn 0.5 0.12 0.44 0.824 0.322 0.049 .044 - - -
Pn 0.4 - - - - - .36 0.671 .036
δ 0.7 0.35 0.55 0.968 0.372 .127 .055 - - -
δ 0.9 0.31 0.51 0.983 0.312 .11 .051 - - -
The parameters being changed are: the probability of a car being of high-quality (p),
the quality level of a high-quality used car (wh), the quality level of a low-quality used car
(wl), the new car price (Pn), and the discount rate (δ). The column headings in the second
row are as follows: θu is the marginal used car buyer, θnk is the marginal new car buyer
who keeps wh, tn is the marginal new car buyer, qh is the proportion of high-quality used
cars being driven, Pu is the used car price, and S is the scrappage subsidy. Either one of
two equilibria exist: one with a resale market and the other without. The first row of
numbers shows the results for the case where all the parameters are at their base values as
given in the heading. All numbers in the following rows are to be compared to this first
row. When one parameter is being changed, all others are held at their base values. An
example of how to read the table: if p rises from its base value to 0.7, then the subsidy
rate rises to 0.056.
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity Results to illustrate changes in the Optimal Subsidy
Rate
Parameters Observable Quality Unobservable Quality
β µ S∗o S
∗
0.8 0.5 0.047 0.076
0.8 0.6 0.082 0.093
0.8 0.3 0.021 0.048
0.7 0.4 0.033 0.067
0.6 0.4 0.045 0.058
0.9 0.4 0.018 0.041
Parameters being changed are: β which is the probability of a low-quality used car
being polluting, and µ which is the marginal damage from emissions. The last two column
headings are: S∗o stands for the optimal subsidy rate when car quality is observable, and
S∗ stands for the optimal subsidy rate when car quality is unobservable. Base values of
the parameters are: δ = 0.8, wh = 0.5, wl = 0.1, Pn = 0.7, p = 0.6, α = 0.2, β = 0.8 and
µ = 0.4. The first three rows of results show how the optimal subsidies change with µ, and





Impact of Emissions restriction on utility
(Equation 1.19)
First, totally differentiating utility in 3.1 (holding G fixed)1:
dU = UXdXC + UY dYC + UTAdTA + UTZdTZ − UHdL + UQQZNdZT (A.1)
To balance the government’s budget, any environmental policy that reduces
labor supply must also specify how the lost labor tax revenue will be recovered.
Substituting the first order conditions into A.1 yields:









Totally differentiate resource constraints in 1.15, 1.16, 1.17, and 1.13, as well












− PDZ dZT − PDX dXA − dV − dA− µdZT (A.2)
where µ is defined as −NUQQZ
λ




in terms of observable variables. Totally differentiate the sub-utility functions,
1This G is required in the model to justify the collection of taxes
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Assuming implicit profit maximization in TA and TZ , the ratio of the marginal




































Next, totally differentiate the sub-utility functions TA and TZ in 1.6 and 1.7
and substitute their FOCs,
T̂A = γXAX̂A + (1− γXA)Â (A.8)
T̂Z = γZT ẐT + (1− γZT )V̂ (A.9)
Totally differentiate the sub-utility function T = T (TA, TZ), and substitute
the FOC to get:





. To derive the change in the transportation index PT , I
totally differentiate the implicit zero profit condition and then substitute A.10
to get:
P̂T = αTZ ˆPTZ + (1− αTZ) ˆPTA (A.11)
Totally differentiate 1.15, 1.27, substitute for dXS and dXE into the differ-
entiated 1.15, convert all changes to their respective “hat” forms, and use
X̂S = L̂X = 0 to get the following expression for X̂C :
(PDX XC)X̂C = −Y M ˆY M − (PDZ ZT )ẐT − (PDX XA)X̂A (A.12)
Similarly, totally differentiate 1.16, 1.2, substitute for dY S into the differenti-
ated 1.16 to get the following expression for ŶC :
YC ŶC = LY L̂Y + Y
M ˆY M − V V̂ − AÂ (A.13)
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Appendix B
Impact of Emissions restrictions on change in
gas tax (Equation 1.30)
The elasticities of substitution in the two transportation sectors defined
in 1.23 and 1.24 are reduced to:
X̂A = Â = T̂A (B.1)
ẐT = V̂ − σTZ ˆtZT (B.2)
I get X̂A = Â because ˆsXA = ŝA = 0. Substitute for Â from B.1 into 1.28:








(1− tL)L X̂A (B.3)
Substitute expression for t̂L from B.3 into ŵ = −t̂L − φZT ˆtZT to get:
ŵ =
tL
1− tL L̂ +
tZT ZT
(1− tL)LẐT + φZT
Iπ
wL
ˆtZT − sAA + sXAXA
(1− tL)L X̂A (B.4)
Using the definition of σT , B.1, A.9 and substituting for V̂ from B.2, I get:
X̂A = ẐT + [(1− γZT )σTZ + σT γZT ] ˆtZT (B.5)
Substitute B.5 into 1.29:
L̂ =
1
1− tl − εtL [(ε(tZT
ZT
L









− η(δR + δZ))φZT ˆtZT ]] (B.6)
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I know that Ĉ = X̂C = ŶC and substitute that into the definition for σJ to
get:
X̂C = T̂ + σJ P̂T (B.7)
Substitute A.9 and B.2 into A.10 and use the resulting expression for T̂ with
B.5 and substitute into B.7 to get:
X̂C = ẐT + [(1− γZT )σTZ + σT γZT ] ˆtZT (B.8)
Add A.12 to A.13, use X̂A = Â, LL̂ = LY L̂Y and X̂C = ŶC and substitute for
V̂ from B.2:
(PDX XC + YC)X̂C = −(PDZ ZT )ẐT − (PDX XA + A)X̂A + LL̂− V (ẐT + σTZ ˆtZT )
(B.9)
Substitute for X̂C from B.8, for X̂A from B.5, and finally for L̂ from B.6 into
B.9 to get 1.30. The change in total labor supply is obtained by substituting
1.30 and B.5 into 1.29 to get:
L̂ =
1
1− tl − εtL [(ε(tZT
ZT
L





)[1 + ((1− γZT )σTZ + σT γZT )C1
C2
])





− η(δR + δZ))]ẐT
= C3ẐT (B.10)
Substitute B.10, 1.36 and 1.30 into 1.28 to get:
t̂L = [− tL
1− tL C3 −
tZT ZT
(1− tL)L −












Substitute B.11 and 1.30 into ŵ = −t̂L − P̂J :
ŵ = −(C4 + φZT C1
C2
)ẐT (B.12)
Finally, substitute 1.30 into B.8 to get:







1− tL − εtL ẐT +
(1− tL)tL(L/I)






− η(δR + δZ))ẐT




1− tL − εtL )X̂A + (tZT − µ)(ZT /I)ẐT (B.14)
If the initial value of the gas tax is zero or anywhere below the Pigouvian tax,
then the fourth term is an unambiguous gain from pollution abatement. Pre-
existing subsidies to ethanol and AFV, a rise in ethanol consumption and the
number of AFVs reduces welfare (third term). The greater is the value of pre-
existing subsidies to the overall size of the economy, the larger is the magnitude
of this impact. The first term represents the direct cost of restricting emissions
and has a negative effect on welfare. The second term encompasses the impact
of pollution restriction on compensated labor supply, which was positive from
earlier discussions and thus, has a positive effect on welfare. However, the net
effect on welfare then depends on specific values of the parameters as well as
on how high is the initial value of the gas tax. Note that in the absence of
pre-existing taxes on gasoline and subsidies to AFVs and AF, an emissions
restriction achieved through a higher gas tax results in a double dividend.
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Appendix C
Impact of emissions restriction, given ŝA on
ˆsXA (Equation 1.44)
In this case, the elasticity of substitution defined in 1.24 gives ẐT =
V̂ = T̂Z since ˆtZT = 0. However, the resultant effect on labor supply depends
on whether real net wage rises and outweighs the impact of the subsidies. The
necessary change in the labor tax for the government to balance its budget
when it changes sXA and sA is modified from 1.26 to:












(1− tL)L ˆsXA (C.1)
From the definition of σT and using T̂Z = ẐT , I get: T̂A = ẐT − σT ˆPTA.
Substitute for T̂A from A.8, and for Â from 1.23 into this expression:
X̂A = ẐT + [σT γXA + σTA(1− γXA)] ˆsXA + (1− γXA)(σT − σTA)ŝA (C.2)
Substitute for Â from 1.23 into A.8, substitute the resulting expression for T̂A
into A.10 and use T̂Z = ẐT to get:
T̂ = (1− αTZ)X̂A − σTA(1− γXA)(1− αTZ)( ˆsXA − ŝA) + αTZẐT (C.3)
I know that Ĉ = X̂C = ŶC . Substitute C.3, C.2 that into the definition for σJ :
X̂C = ẐT + (σT − σJ)(1− αTZ)[γXA ˆsXA + (1− γXA)ŝA) (C.4)
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Substitute for Â from 1.23 into C.1, and use the resulting expression in ŵ =
−t̂L + φXA ˆsXA + φAŝA:
ŵ =
tL




(1− tL)L X̂A −
(φXA − σTAsA(A/I))
(1− tL)L ˆsXA
− (σTAsA(A/I) + φA)
(1− tL)L ŝA (C.5)
Add A.12 to A.13, and substitute for Â from 1.23, use LL̂ = LY L̂Y to substi-
tute for L̂Y , substitute for ŶC from X̂C = ŶC , substitute for V̂ from ẐT = V̂ ,
substitute C.4,C.2 and labor expression into the resulting expression:
(PDX XC +YC)X̂C = −(PDZ ZT +V )ẐT −(PDX XA+A)X̂A+LL̂+σTAA( ˆsXA− ŝA)
(C.6)
Substitute C.2, C.4, and 1.43 into C.6 to get 1.44. Change in ethanol con-
sumption is obtained by substituting 1.47 and 1.49 into C.2:
X̂A = B6ẐT (C.7)
where B6 = 1+(σT γXA +σTA(1−γXA))(B1B5+B2B4B4B5 )+ (σT −σTA)(1−γXA)B4B5 .
Substituting 1.47 and 1.49 into C.6, I get the change in consumption goods:
X̂C = ŶC = Ĉ = B7ẐT (C.8)
where B7 = 1 + (1 − αTZ)(σT − σJ)(γXA(B1B5+B2B4B4B5 ) + (1 − γXA)B4B5 ). The
change in ethanol consumption is obtained by substituting C.7,1.47 and 1.49
into 1.23:
Â = B8ẐT (C.9)
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where B8 = B6 − σTA(B1B5+B2B4B4B5 − B4B5 ). The change in price per ethanol mile
is obtained by substituting 1.47 and 1.49 into the definition for ˆPTA given in
Section 2 to get:
ˆPTA = B9ẐT (C.10)
where B9 = γXA(
B1B5+B2B4
B4B5
) + (1 − γXA)B4B5 . The change in ethanol miles is
obtained by substituting C.10 into the definition of σT .
T̂A = B10ẐT (C.11)
where B10 = 1 − σT B9. The change in total miles driven is obtained by
substituting C.11 and T̂Z = ẐT into A.10.
T̂ = B11ẐT (C.12)
where B11 = (1 − αTZ)B10 + αTZ . The change in the overall price index is
obtained by substituting 1.47 and 1.49 into the definition for change in PJ
given in Section 2.2.
P̂J = B12ẐT (C.13)
where B12 = −[φXA(B1B5+B2B4B4B5 ) + φA B4B5 . The change in the price index of
transportation is obtained by substituting 1.47 and 1.49 into the definition for
change in PT given in Section 2.2.
P̂T = B13ẐT (C.14)
where B13 = (1 − αTZ)B9. Substituting for C.7,1.47 and 1.49 into 1.43 I get
change in labor supply as a function of ẐT . Substituting resulting expression
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for L̂, C.7,1.47 and 1.49 into 1.41 I get the change in labor tax as a function
of ẐT . Finally, substituting C.7,1.47 and 1.49 and the final reduced form
expression for L̂ into 1.42, I get the reduced form expression for the change in
real net wage as a function of ẐT .
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Appendix D
θ is increasing in car quality
Proof : First note that P ol < P
o
h . If this was not true, then nobody
would purchase low quality used cars. Now I need to show that types who
buy wh do not buy wl, and vice versa. For this not to happen, the following
incentive compatibility constraints must be satisfied:
θ(wh)wh − P oh ≥ θ(wh)wl − P ol ⇔ θ(wh)[wh − wl] ≥ P oh − P ol (D.1)
θ(wl)wh − P oh ≤ θ(wl)wl − P ol ⇔ θ(wl)[wh − wl] ≤ P oh − P ol (D.2)
Combining the two conditions, I get: θ(wl)[wh−wl] ≤ P oh−P ol ≤ θ(wh)[wh−wl].





Thus, there exists θoh : θ
o
l < θ < θ
o
h buy used cars of quality wl, and θ
o
h < θ < θ
o
n
buy good quality used cars. Similarly the types who purchase new cars have
valuations for cars that are higher than those who purchase used cars of high
quality. In other words, there exists θon : θ
o
n < θ < θ purchase new cars.
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Appendix E
Optimal Subsidy when car quality is
observable
Solving for each of the above endogenous variables in terms of the
subsidy rate, S and Pn, I get:
θh =
(1 + p)Pn − (1 + p)δS − p(1− wh)





(1 + p)Pn − (1 + p)δS − p(1− wh)




Ph = θh(wh − wl) + S = (1 + p)Pn − (1 + p)δS − p(1− wh)









(1 + p)Pn − (1 + p)δS − p(1− wh)







Pl = S (E.4)
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P 1h = (wh − wl)θ1h + 1 (E.10)



























θ − Pn + δ(pPh + (1− p)Pl)





















Differentiating the welfare equation with respect to S and set equal to
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zero:
(1− δ)W ′(S) = −2(1− wh)θnθ1n + δpP 1h + δ(1− p)P 1l − Phθ1n − θnP 1h
− δ(pPh + (1− p)Pl)θ1n − θnδ(pP 1h + (1− p)P 1l ) + Pnθ1n





ls − µ∂QE(θ1h − θ1lk) = 0 (E.12)
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Appendix F
Optimal Subsidy rate when quality is not
observable
I substitute the reduced form solutions of each of the endogenous vari-
ables in terms of S, differentiate the welfare function and set it equal to zero
to solve for S∗. The solution for wu is as follows:
(A + BS)wu + (D + ES) = 0 (F.1)
where:
A = p(1 + δp)(1 + δ)(wh − wl)
B = p(1 + δp)(wh − wl)Pn − 2pwh(1 + δ)(1 + δp)(wh − wl)
+ wh(1− wh)(2− p)(1 + δ)
− 2(1 + δp)(wh − wl)(1− wh) + p2wh((1 + δp)(1 + δ)(wh − wl)
Substituting the solution into each of the marginal conditions gives us
solutions for the endogenous variables in terms of S. I then substitute each
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